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A NEW ERA OF TAX ENFORCEMENT: FROM ‘BIG STICK’ 
TO RESPONSIVE REGULATION 
Sagit Leviner* 
This Article explores the economics of crime and compliance as the dominant ap-
proach to U.S. tax enforcement of the past three and a half decades. It evaluates 
the key advantages and disadvantages of the economic model as well as its appli-
cation to tax. The Article then addresses the multiplicity of taxpayer behavior and 
the need and prospect of balancing the economically conceived methods of detection 
and punishment against other, more cooperative, means and developing a broader 
approach to tax enforcement more generally. The Article explores responsive regula-
tion as a case study for an alternative method to tax enforcement that heavily 
draws on the economic paradigm but also supplements this approach with other 
theories, particularly those involving taxpayer identity, conflict escalation, and 
procedural justice. The Article suggests that this broader, more balanced, and 
closely tailored method of regulating responsively may enable regulators to draw on 
the advantages of the economic model while alleviating some of its drawbacks. Re-
sponsive regulation may therefore constitute a superior method for regulating tax 
compliance. 
Introduction 
The operation of the federal government is heavily dependent on 
income taxes; in 2005, about 43 percent of Federal tax revenue in 
the United States came from individual income taxes and another 
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13 percent from corporate income taxes.1 This amounts to $927 bil-
lion and $278 billion, respectively2 and, compared with Fiscal Year 
2004, an increase of 14.6 percent in individual income taxes and 
47 percent in corporate income taxes.3 Every year, however, the 
government collects billions of dollars less in tax money than it be-
lieves is owed. This difference between taxes owed and taxes 
collected, otherwise known as the “tax gap,”4 is substantial and has 
roughly tripled over the past two decades.5 Estimates released in 
February 2006 indicate that the U.S. tax gap for the 2001 tax year 
stands at approximately $345 billion,6 corresponding to a noncom-
pliance rate of about 16.3 percent of taxes owed.7 Through 
enforcement activities and collection of other late payments, the 
IRS has sought to close some of this gap, still leaving an enormous 
net deficit of approximately $290 billion for the 2001 tax year.8  
Maintaining the integrity of the tax system is hardly a recent 
challenge for civilizations. For centuries, tax noncompliance has 
been notorious for furthering a climate of disrespect, antagonism, 
and selfishness in the relationship among citizens and between 
them and their governments.9 When taxes are compromised, the 
                                                   
1. U.S. Dep’t of Treasury, Combined Statement of Receipts, Outlays, and Bal-
ances 11 (2005), available at http://www.fms.treas.gov/annualreport/cs2005/receipt.pdf. 
2. Id. 
3. Id. at 12. 
4. According to the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) the tax gap is “the difference be-
tween what taxpayers should have paid and what they actually paid on a timely basis.” I.R.S. 
News Release IR-2006-28, IRS Updates Tax Gap Estimates (Feb. 14, 2006), available at 
http://www.irs.gov/newsroom/article/0,,id=154496,00.html; see also I.R.S. News Release FS-
2005-14, Understanding the Tax Gap (Mar. 2005) (“The tax gap measures the extent to 
which taxpayers do not file their tax returns and pay the correct tax on time.”), available at 
http://www.irs.gov/newsroom/article/0,,id=137246,00.html. Others clarify that “the tax gap 
is not equal to the amount of additional revenue that would be collected by stricter en-
forcement.” Luigi Alberto Franzoni, Tax Evasion and Tax Compliance, in 6 Encyclopedia of 
Law and Economics 52, 53 (Boudewijn Bouckaert & Gerrit De Geest eds., 2000).  
5. Alex Raskolnikov, Crime and Punishment in Taxation: Deceit, Deterrence, and the Self-
Adjusting Penalty, 106 Colum. L. Rev. 569, 574 (2006). 
6. I.R.S. News Release IR-2006-28, supra note 4. 
7. The Tax Gap and How to Solve It: Testimony Before the Senate Committee on the Budget, 
109th Cong. 3 (2006) (written testimony of Mark Everson, Commissioner, IRS), available at 
www.senate.gov/~budget/democratic/testimony/2006/everson_taxgap021506.pdf [herein-
after The Tax Gap]. Both of these numbers fall at the high end of the range of estimates 
provided by the IRS in the spring of 2005. I.R.S. News Release IR-2006-28, supra note 4. 
8. I.R.S. News Release IR-2006-28, supra note 4. Notice, however, the statement of the 
Commissioner of the Internal Revenue Service, Mark W. Everson, that “the vast majority of 
Americans pay their taxes accurately and are shortchanged by those who don’t pay their fair 
share.” The Tax Gap, supra note 7.  
9. John S. Carroll, A Cognitive-Process Analysis of Taxpayer Compliance, in 2 Taxpayer 
Compliance 228, 228 (Jeffrey A. Roth & John T. Scholz eds., 1989); see also Frank A. Cow-
ell, Cheating the Government: The Economics of Evasion 101–24 (1990) (claiming 
that noncompliance can generate resentment among taxpayers, eventually escalating to 
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tax system becomes a deficient means for raising money to pursue 
and implement government goals, and actual tax collection fails to 
reflect the statutorily intended taxation plan.10 This creates disturb-
ing results such as upsetting the distribution of the tax burden and, 
more generally, wealth in society.11 For instance, when wealthy citi-
zens have better opportunities and means to reduce their tax 
liabilities compared with other less well-off citizens, the taxes col-
lected are likely to result in a more regressive and less equitable 
system than Congress intended.12 Abusive tax practices also jeop-
ardize horizontal equity when opportunities to reduce or eliminate 
tax liability are distributed unequally.13 More generally, in a country 
with fixed revenue requirements, reducing the tax liability for any 
given sector of taxpayers, in effect, means that higher and more 
distortionary taxes are levied on others.14 All of this, in turn, pro-
duces inefficiencies as market competition is affected by the 
unequal distribution of the tax burden and economic practices 
motivated by tax abuse, translating to a deadweight loss to society.15  
Despite the evident benefits entailed in improving tax compli-
ance, several factors, including the complexity of the Tax Code, the 
magnitude and persistent levels of noncompliance, and democratic 
principles that restrain government agencies from interfering with 
the private conduct of citizens, combine to make it so that no tax 
system achieves perfect compliance.16 Still, due to the size of the tax 
gap, even a small or moderate reduction in existing noncompliance 
can yield substantial returns and improve the government’s ability to 
pursue its goals. According to a 2004 Government Accountability 
Office report, each one percent reduction in the U.S. net tax gap is 
                                                   
these taxpayers undertaking acts of noncompliance as a form of protest against the govern-
ment and the tax administration or as a means of equalizing the tax burden).  
10. See, e.g., Joel Slemrod, Why People Pay Taxes: Introduction, in Why People Pay Taxes 
1, 1 (Joel Slemrod ed., 1992) (“It is impossible to understand the true impact of a country’s 
tax system by looking only at the tax base and the tax rates applied to that base. A critical 
intermediating factor is how the tax law is administrated and enforced. What is apparently a 
highly progressive tax rate structure may, in fact, be proportional, or even regressive, if taxes 
levied on the wealthy are not collected. What is apparently a tax base finely tuned to reflect 
individual differences in ability to pay may, in fact, produce a capricious distribution of tax 
liabilities if the tax law is selectively enforced.”).  
11. See Louis Kaplow, How Tax Complexity and Enforcement Affect the Equity and Efficiency of 
the Income Tax, 49 Nat’l Tax J. 135, 140–42 (1996).  
12. See James Andreoni, Brian Erard & Jonathan Feinstein, Tax Compliance, 36 J. Econ. 
Literature 818, 818 (1998). 
13. Franzoni, supra note 4, at 55. 
14. Andreoni et al., supra note 12, at 818.  
15. See Franzoni, supra note 4, at 55; Andreoni et al., supra note 12, at 818. 
16. I.R.S. News Release IR-2006-28, supra note 4 (indicating the administrative inapt-
ness to completely eliminate the tax gap). 
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likely to yield more than $2.5 billion annually.17 Thus, a 10 to 20 
percent reduction could translate to $25 to $50 billion or more in 
additional revenue annually.18  
In recent years the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) has taken a 
number of steps to bolster enforcement and ease the tax gap. The 
IRS budget request for Fiscal Year 2005 was $10.674 billion, $490 
million more than the amount proposed for Fiscal Year 2004.19 
Three hundred million dollars of this increase was allocated for 
enforcement.20 The enforcement budget was used to raise the 
number of audits of high-income taxpayers to 221,000 reviews in 
Fiscal Year 2005, the highest number of reviews in 10 years.21 Simi-
larly, the number of audits of all taxpayers increased to 1.2 million 
in 2004, 20 percent more than the year before.22 As a result of these 
steps and others, the IRS reported an increase in its enforcement 
revenue of nearly 40 percent, from a total of $33.8 billion in 2001 
to $47.3 billion in 2005.23 However, despite these increases in en-
forcement and revenue, the difference between taxes owed and 
taxes collected in the United States remains considerable.24 This 
raises the question whether the steps taken thus far are sufficient to 
                                                   
17. Tax Compliance: Reducing the Tax Gap Can Contribute to Fiscal Sustainability but Will Re-
quire a Variety of Strategies: Hearing Before the S. Comm. On Finance (GAO-05-527T3), 109th 
Cong. 3, 16 (2005) (statement of David M. Walker, Comptroller Gen. of the United States), 
available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d05527t.pdf. 
18. Id. at 16 (adding that a significant reduction of the tax gap is likely to depend on 
improvement in tax compliance rates). 
19. Internal Revenue Serv., Budget in Brief, Fiscal Year 2005, at 4 (2004). 
20. The remainder of the increase, $190 million, was allotted for reinvestments in con-
sumer service, maintenance of existing levels of performances, and physical infrastructure 
consolidation. See id. 
21. I.R.S. News Release IR-2006-28, supra note 4. Here, high-income taxpayers are de-
fined as those taxpayers earning $100,000 or more annually. Id. 
22. Id. 
23. Id. The increase in revenue between 2001 and 2005 due to examination measures 
is $9.8 million, and from document matching is $1.5 million, totaling $11.3 million of addi-
tional tax money collected. This is compared with an increase in revenue of $2.2 million due 
to other forms of collection during that time. See id. (enforcement revenue tbl.). See, how-
ever, more recent reductions in enforcement and revenue. According to IRS estimates, in 
2008 the audit rate of individuals fell to 1.01% (from 1.03% in 2007), a decrease that was 
most pronounced with respect to high wealth individuals where the audit rate fell to 5.57% 
from 6.84% in 2007. In 2008 collections also fell for the first time in a decade, down 4.7% 
from 2007, to $56.4 billion. Internal Revenue Serv., Fiscal Year 2008 Enforcement 
Results, available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-news/2008_enforcement.pdf. 
24. Importantly, the tax gap estimates take only certain components of income misre-
porting into account. These estimates do not consider, for instance, taxes that are legally 
minimized. Once accounted for, tax noncompliance (broadly defined) may provide a more 
realistic (albeit gloomy) description of taxpaying behavior and the challenge of protecting 
the integrity of the tax system. Note, for example, recent headlines suggesting that two-
thirds of corporations paid zero income taxes in the U.S. between 1998 and 2005. Jennifer 
Kerr, Most Companies in US Avoid Federal Income Taxes, ABC News, Washington DC, Au-
gust 12, 2008, available at: http://abcnews.go.com/Business/wireStory?id=5561455. 
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alleviate the problem of tax noncompliance. If not sufficient, what 
alternatives are available to government agencies and other regula-
tory institutions?  
This Article explores one alternative solution to the problem of 
noncompliance. It suggests that expansion of the traditional tax 
compliance analysis to include responsive elements of regulation, 
as illustrated in the Australian Tax Office’s (ATO) approach to tax 
enforcement, may yield a more useful and forward-looking method 
for improving tax compliance than those available under other sys-
tems. The responsive regulation approach is based on the 
proposition that effective enforcement requires a dynamic and 
gradual application of less to more severe sanctions and regulatory 
interventions.25 This range of sanctions and interventions balances 
traditional authoritarian deterrence with strategies that rely on 
persuasion and encouragement through three states of communi-
cation: cooperation, toughness, and forgiveness.26 The Australian 
approach also advocates developing a deeper understanding of the 
motives, circumstances, and characteristics of taxpayers, so tax au-
thorities can tailor enforcement to more effectively deliver 
compliance.27 With responsive regulation, the intent is to preserve 
the basic principles of economic analysis that view taxpayers as ra-
tional actors seeking to maximize their expected utility. Responsive 
regulation goes a step further, however, and also considers other 
parameters, including the way that society, morality, and ethics af-
fect taxpayer behavior and, particularly, the manner in which the 
taxpayer-tax administration relationship shapes compliance.  
Given that the ATO first introduced responsive regulation in its 
administration during the late 1990s, compliance improvement 
data on this approach to tax is somewhat limited at this point. This 
Article therefore focuses on fleshing out the underlying principles 
and rationales of the Australian paradigm. In a few years, the Austra-
lian model can be evaluated against more comprehensive data and 
empirical work. In the meantime, the interest countries such as the 
United Kingdom and Canada show in the Australian model, and 
the implementation of this approach in New Zealand and East 
                                                   
25. John Braithwaite, To Punish or Persuade (1985).  
26. Ian Ayres & John Braithwaite, Responsive Regulation: Transcending the 
Deregulation Debate (1992). 
27. See Cash Economy Task Force, Australian Taxation Office, Improving Tax 
Compliance in the Cash Economy 18–21 (1997) [hereinafter Cash Economy Task Force 
1997], available at http://www.ato.gov.au/content/downloads/SB39065.pdf; Cash Economy 
Task Force, Australian Taxation Office, Improving Tax Compliance in the 
Cash Economy 19–21 (1998) [hereinafter Cash Economy Task Force 1998], available at 
http://www.ato.gov.au/content/downloads/SB39073.pdf.  
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Timor, may indicate that the responsive interpretation to tax en-
forcement is more than a passing phase.28  
Part I of this Article discusses the main reasons tax compliance is 
a challenge for tax administrations and the manner in which eco-
nomic analysis offers important insights into and methodological 
guidance for understanding tax noncompliance and fostering com-
pliance. Part II reviews the origins of the economic analysis of 
compliance, explains how the economic model was introduced 
into the area of tax enforcement, and explores recent develop-
ments and challenges in that area. Part III discusses key advantages 
and disadvantages of the economic approach to tax enforcement 
and concludes that the economic model is persuasive in many re-
spects yet flawed in others. In Part IV, the Article introduces the 
Australian approach to tax enforcement, and explains the manner 
in which this approach draws on the economics of crime and com-
pliance model and how it moves beyond the economic realm to 
rely on other theories. The Article suggests that as a result of this 
multi-faceted approach, the Australian paradigm has the potential 
to capture the strengths of the economic model while also address-
ing some of its drawbacks. Part V summarizes and concludes, 
suggesting that the Australian approach may mark the beginning 
of a new era of tax enforcement.  
The focus of this Article is personal income tax compliance, al-
though much of the discussion provides important insight into 
other tax and regulatory areas. Regrettably, there are many impor-
tant issues that fall outside the scope of this Article. Most notably, 
the Article does not explicitly discuss the underground economy, 
or the difficulties with collecting taxes internationally, nor does it 
consider the relative advantages and disadvantages of sales taxes or 
Value Added Tax (VAT) compared with income taxation in terms 
of their ease of enforcement. These issues, although important, are 
left for future inquiries. 
                                                   
28. For an interesting discussion on the implementation of responsive regulation in 
tax enforcement in Australia, New Zealand, and East Timor, see Jenny Job, Andrew Stout & 
Rachael Smith, Culture Change in Three Taxation Administrations: From Command-and-Control to 
Responsive Regulation, 29 Law & Policy 84 (2007) (focusing on issues of organizational cul-
ture and change). For an OECD report on tax enforcement that references the Australian 
model and related research efforts, see Forum on Tax Administration Compliance Sub-
Group, Organization for Economic Co-Operation and Development, Compliance Risk 
Management: Managing and Improving Tax Compliance (2004), http://www.oecd.org/ 
dataoecd/44/19/33818656.pdf.  
For a more recent analysis, this time with respect to U.S. tax administration, see Marjory 
E. Kornhauser, Normative and Cognitive Aspects of Tax Compliance: Literature Review and Recom-
mendations for the IRS Regarding Individual Taxpayers, in 2 Nat’l Taxpayer Advocate, 2007 
Report to Congress 138 (2007) (exploring the role of “tax morale” in the IRS’s enforcement 
and research efforts).  
6
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I. The Problem and Modeling of Tax Compliance 
The difficulties of tax enforcement emerge, largely, because the 
variables that define the tax base are not usually observable.29 With-
out detailed information about the taxpayer’s transactions and her 
overall financial and other tax-related standing, no one but the 
taxpayer can know whether she is truthful and accurate in her re-
ports to the tax authority. To a certain degree, verifying 
information may be obtained by means of costly audits or third-
party reporting, such as by banks and employers.30 Assuming this 
information is acquired in a timely and cost-efficient manner and is 
found to be accurate and coherent, the tax base becomes verifi-
able.31 In other cases, however, as when the taxpayer is involved in 
transactions that are beyond the reach of the tax authority and of-
ficial statistics, including where income is received by way of cash 
transactions, the tax base is almost impossible to verify.32  
The taxpayer is able to use the unobservable nature of the tax 
base to her advantage, or in other cases make innocent mistakes 
and report partial or otherwise incorrect figures on her tax return 
in a manner that is difficult to detect. At times it can also be diffi-
cult for the tax administration to clearly identify those taxpayers 
who are most likely to be noncompliant. Key determinants for tax-
payer compliance, such as the perceived probability of detection 
and the benefits of evasion, can be tricky to capture and compute. 
These shortcomings make it extremely complicated to not only 
detect or correct noncompliance but also to study and better un-
derstand its possible causes and facilitators. Amidst these 
difficulties, economic analysis intervenes and offers methodologi-
cal guidance for, and important insights into, understanding and 
addressing the issue of tax noncompliance.  
Over the past four decades, the economic analysis of compliance 
has played a pivotal role in elucidating the issue of compliance and, 
specifically, pinpointing those factors involved in the lack of compli-
ance of taxpayers. As they examine compliance issues, analysts 
simplify the many complexities involved to produce a coherent 
                                                   
29. See Robert A. Kagan, On the Visibility of Income Tax Law Violations, in 2 Taxpayer 
Compliance 76 (Jeffrey A. Roth and John T. Scholz eds., 1989); see also Franzoni, supra note 
4, at 54–55 (adding that tax evasion and avoidance and their harmful consequences may in 
fact be worsened by laws or even constitutions when they are drafted as if the tax base is 
observable because this limits the corrective instruments available to the government, such 
as setting tax rates according to their degree of enforceability). 
30. Kagan, supra note 29, at 79. 
31. Franzoni, supra note 4, at 54. 
32. Id.; Kagan, supra note 29, at 88. 
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framework that draws attention to the essential questions at hand.33 
Modeling tax compliance also allows analysts to examine and com-
pare the possible consequences of different enforcement 
strategies. This, in turn, enables policymakers to deliberate on and 
offer alternative policy instruments to employ.34  
Notwithstanding valuable information that becomes available 
through economic analysis, economic models provide, at best, 
“tentative guidance . . . in well-specified circumstances.”35 Because 
models, by definition, simplify a much more complex reality, they 
can be subject to criticism as being unrealistic.36 Improvements in 
data and methodology help bring models closer to real-life sce-
narios. All models, however, have their shortcomings, and these 
must be recognized when models are implemented to generate 
policy recommendations. With these limitations in mind, the next 
Part of this Article will introduce the basic elements of the eco-
nomic model of compliance with the law. It will then explore the 
application of the economic model to taxation and will discuss de-
velopments and challenges in that area. 
II. Economic Analysis and Tax Enforcement  
A. Criminal Law Enforcement and the Deterrence Hypothesis  
“The profit of the crime is the force which urges a man to delinquency: 
the pain of the punishment is the force employed to restrain him from 
it. If the first of these forces be the greater, the crime will be committed; 
if the second, the crime will not be committed.” 37  
The principal model for analyzing compliance with the law de-
rives from the classic work in utilitarianism of Jeremy Bentham and 
                                                   
33. See John Creedy, Tax Modelling, in 1 Taxation and Economic Behaviour: Intro-
ductory Surveys in Economics 133, 135–36 (John Creedy ed., 2001). 
34. Id. at 135. 
35. Id. at 136; see also Frank Cowell, Carrots and Sticks in Enforcement, in The Crisis in 
Tax Administration 230, 231 (Henry J. Aaron & Joel Slemrod eds., 2004). 
36. See, e.g., Michael G. Allingham & Agnar Sandmo, Income Tax Evasion: A Theoretical 
Analysis, 1 J. Pub. Econ. 323, 325 (1972) (“Even though we ignore these points, we hope to 
have retained enough of the structure of the problem to make the theoretical analysis 
worthwhile.”); see also Leslie Book, Study of the Role of Preparers in Relation to Taxpayer Compli-
ance with Internal Revenue Laws, in Nat’l Taxpayer Advocate, 2 2007 Report to Congress 
44, 55–57 (2007) (discussing the importance of utilizing various alternative models to un-
derstand taxpayer compliance). 
37. Jeremy Bentham, Principles of Penal Law (1788), reprinted in 1 Jeremy Ben-
tham, The Works of Jeremy Bentham, at 399 (John Hill Burton ed., 1843) (footnote 
omitted). 
8
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Cesare Beccaria who laid the foundation for a framework of analy-
sis that tells a relatively straightforward and realistic story of human 
behavior.38 The basic premise of the utilitarian theory is that people 
behave rationally in order to maximize their expected utility.39 In 
the context of compliance the assumption is that, facing several 
plausible courses of action, some of which are legal while others 
are not, individuals choose whether to commit a crime or not 
based on which option has the better prospect of increasing their 
utility.40 The economic approach to crime and compliance, al-
though influential at the time of its conception, received very little 
attention from later theorists and policymakers until Gary Becker 
modernized it in his path-breaking article Crime and Punishment: An 
Economic Approach.41 
In the decades prior to the publication of Becker’s article, dis-
cussions of crime were dominated by the opinion that criminal 
behavior is caused by mental illness and social oppression and that 
criminals are no more than victims of their life circumstances.42 
These attitudes began to have a major influence on social policy, as 
governments enacted laws to expand the rights of those who were 
essentially lawbreakers.43 Becker not only rejected the presumption 
that criminals are helpless victims of their situation but he also took 
issue with the associated policy implications, which, according to 
                                                   
38. Id. See generally Jeremy Bentham, The Theory of Legislation (Richard Hildreth 
trans., Harcourt, Brace & Co. 1931); Cesare Beccaria, On Crimes and Punishments 
(David Young trans., Hackett Pub. Co. 1986) (1764); Gary S. Becker, Nobel Lecture: The Eco-
nomic Way of Looking at Behavior, 101 J. Pol. Econ. 385, 391 (1993) (“One reason why the 
economic approach to crime became so influential is that the same analytical apparatus can 
be used to study enforcement of all laws, including minimum wage legislation, clean air acts, 
insider trader [sic] and other violations of security laws, and income tax evasions.”).  
39. According to the utilitarian model, people have preferences and choose among 
different alternatives in a manner that maximizes the likelihood of obtaining their preferred 
outcomes. The expected utility of any decision alternative is assessed by identifying the pos-
sible consequences or outcomes, assigning a desirability or utility to each outcome, and 
attaching likelihoods to the different outcomes. Each outcome is multiplied by its likeli-
hood, and the discounted outcomes, or weight, are summed to “create” the expected utility 
of that alternative. The alternative with the most favorable expected utility is then selected 
and implemented. See Carroll, supra note 9, at 229; see also Marco R. Steenbergen, Kathleen 
M. McGraw & John T. Scholz, Taxpayer Adaptation to the 1986 Tax Reform Act: Do New Tax Laws 
Affect the Way Taxpayers Think About Taxes? in Why People Pay Taxes 9, 14 (Joel Slemrod ed., 
1992) (suggesting a dominance of self-interest, particularly, in the study of human behavior 
in public choice theories of economics, as well as motivational theories in psychology).  
40. See generally Bentham, supra notes 37–38; Beccaria, supra note 38. 
41. Gary S. Becker, Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach, 76 J. Pol. Econ. 169 
(1968). 
42. Becker, supra note 38, at 390. 
43. Id. 
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him, “reduced the apprehension and conviction of criminals and 
provided less protection to the law-abiding population.”44 
Instead of adhering to theories of mental illness and social op-
pression, Becker’s work explores the possibility that criminal 
behavior is rational and that regulators and policymakers should 
address it as such.45 Becker returns to the utilitarian principles of 
Bentham and Beccaria to suggest that, ultimately, individuals de-
cide whether to commit a crime or obey the law based on a 
reasoned calculation of the costs and benefits of either course. 
Since the final consequences of criminal behavior are generally 
uncertain, Becker draws on the common assumption that people 
act as if they are maximizing expected utility and that utility is a 
positive function of income. In Becker’s words: 
[A] person commits an offense if the expected utility to him 
exceeds the utility he could get by using his time and other 
resources at other activities. Some persons become “crimi-
nals,” therefore, not because their basic motivation differs 
from that of other persons, but because their benefits and 
costs [resulting from compliance and noncompliance with the 
law] differ.46  
Focusing on the costs and benefits associated with human behav-
ior, the “deterrence hypothesis” emerges. It suggests that, if 
individuals are rational decisionmakers seeking to maximize ex-
pected utility, the way to foster compliance with the law is to deter 
individuals from acts of noncompliance by ensuring that the ex-
pected utility of noncompliance will be lower than the expected 
utility of compliance.47 In particular, Becker’s analysis advances the 
proposition that public resources ought to be allocated to policy 
measures of two kinds: one aimed at detecting noncompliers, and 
the other designed to ensure devastating consequences for offend-
                                                   
44. Id. 
45. Despite Becker’s approach to crime, concepts like depravity, insanity, abnormality, 
deviance, and deprivation are still widely used to characterize those who commit crimes 
outside of the realm of the economic analysis, especially for hate crimes and crimes of pas-
sion. See Erling Eide, Economics of Criminal Behavior, in 5 Encyclopedia of Law and 
Economics 345, 345 (Boudewijn Bouckaert & Gerrit De Geest eds., 2000). For that matter, 
criminologists have generally been more interested in rehabilitation and treatment, and 
many are reluctant to accept studies of deterrence in general and models of criminal behav-
ior based on rational choice theory in particular. However, these scholars still pay close 
attention to the empirical studies in the economics of crime literature, and sociologists have 
recently carried out similar research. See id. at 346; Becker, supra note 38, at 391 (citing lit-
erature). 
46. Becker, supra note 41, at 176. 
47. Id. at 176–79. 
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ers.48 According to this line of thinking, balancing enforcement 
resources between these two measures becomes the regulatory key 
to effectively deter offenders and promote compliance as the ra-
tional choice of behavior.49  
B. The Allingham-Sandmo Model of Tax Evasion 
Compared with the general economic theory of crime, its tax 
noncompliance counterpart is a relatively recent development, dat-
ing back a little over thirty-five years and, particularly, to the much-
cited article Income Tax Evasion: A Theoretical Analysis, by Michael 
Allingham and Agnar Sandmo.50 Allingham and Sandmo extend 
Gary Becker’s work on the economics of crime and compliance to 
taxation using modern risk theory. Their 1972 publication serves as 
a cornerstone in this area, leading to a large number of scholarly 
contributions either commenting or expanding on their essay.51  
                                                   
48. In a recent article, Becker explains that he first began to think about crime in the 
late 1960s after driving to Columbia University for an oral examination of a student in eco-
nomic theory. Becker was late and had to decide quickly whether to take the extra time to 
put his car in a parking lot or risk getting a ticket for parking illegally on the street. Con-
fronted with this dilemma, Becker contemplated the faster solution of parking on the street 
and assessed the likelihood and severity of getting a ticket for violating the city parking regu-
lations. He reached the conclusion that it was worth it for him to take the risk and park on 
the street. As Becker was walking away from his car to the examination room, it occurred to 
him that “the city authority had probably gone through a similar analysis” and that “[t]he 
frequency of their inspection of parked vehicles and the size of the penalty imposed on viola-
tors should depend on their estimates of the type of [rational] calculations potential 
violators like me would make.” Interestingly enough, Becker did not get a ticket for his park-
ing violation that day. Becker, supra note 38, at 389–90 (emphasis added). 
49. See, e.g., Becker, supra note 41, at 208 (“The conclusion that ‘crime would not pay’ 
is an optimality condition and not an implication about the efficiency of the police or 
courts; indeed, it holds for any level of efficiency, as long as optimal values of p and f [i.e., 
the probability and severity of punishment] appropriate to each level are chosen.”); see also 
id. at 209 (“The main contribution of this essay, as I see it, is to demonstrate that optimal 
policies to combat illegal behavior are part of an optimal allocation of resources.”). 
50. Allingham & Sandmo, supra note 36. Other early attempts to model tax evasion af-
ter the economics of crime include, for example, Serge-Christophe Kolm, A Note on Optimum 
Tax Evasion, 2 J. Pub. Econ. 265 (1973) and Balbir Singh, Making Honesty the Best Policy, 2 J. 
Pub. Econ. 257 (1973). 
51. Note that from the outset Becker intended his analysis to provide a theory broadly 
applicable to compliance including compliance in the context of tax reporting. See Becker, 
supra note 41, at 170 (“Although the word ‘crime’ is used in the title to minimize termino-
logical innovations, the analysis is intended to be sufficiently general to cover all violations, 
not just felonies—like murder, robbery, and assault, which receive so much newspaper cov-
erage—but also tax evasion . . . .”) (emphasis added); see also Allingham & Sandmo, supra 
note 36, at 323 (“On the one hand our approach is related to the studies of economics of 
criminal activities, as e.g. in the papers by Becker (1968) and by Tulkens and Jacquemin 
(1971). On the other hand it is related to the analysis of optimal portfolio and insurance 
policies in the economics of uncertainty, as in the work by Arrow (1970), Mossin (1968a) 
and several others.”). 
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Like previous research in crime, Allingham and Sandmo build 
their analysis around the individual, this time the taxpayer, who 
becomes the potential criminal.52 Their model, which I will call the 
A-S model or framework, explores the decision to evade taxes at 
the moment when the taxpayer is filling in her tax return. The is-
sue of compliance is presented as a portfolio allocation problem in 
which the taxpayer must decide what portion of her income to al-
locate to various activities, some of which are legal (income 
declared on the tax return), while others are illegal (income not 
declared).53 Specifically, the model examines the way compliance 
decisions relate to how the taxpayer perceives that her economic 
opportunities and well-being are affected by enforcement meas-
ures, such as audit probability and the severity of sanctions, as well 
as by the Tax Code more generally, including applicable tax rates.  
Allingham and Sandmo begin their analysis by considering a ba-
sic model in which the authorities decide on the Tax Code and the 
enforcement mechanisms, while each taxpayer acts as if her own 
actions do not influence these decisions.54 The taxpayer is taken to 
be familiar with the tax legislation, the probability of an audit, the 
taxes she is liable for, and the penalty for failing to pay that amount 
in the event that she is caught and convicted.55 Other important 
simplifications usually include the assumptions that the taxpayer is 
risk-averse,56 that the tax system is income-based, and that the tax-
                                                   
52. See, e.g., Allingham & Sandmo, supra note 36, at 323 (“Our objective in this paper is 
. . . analyzing the individual taxpayer’s decision on whether and to what extent to avoid taxes 
by deliberate underreporting.”).  
53. Allingham & Sandmo, supra note 36, at 323. Unlike Becker’s model of compliance 
where the income from crime is a variable separate from legal income, in the A-S framework 
the taxpayer’s initial income becomes a reference point where tax evasion will be under-
taken if the expected utility from evasion is higher than the utility of the initial income. See 
Eide, supra note 45, at 347. A somewhat similar analysis to the portfolio allocation frame-
work was construed such that a person allocates her time (compared with income or wealth) 
between legal and illegal activities. See, e.g., Peter Schmidt & Ann D. Witte, An Economic 
Analysis of Crime and Justice: Theory, Methods, and Applications (1984); Kenneth I. 
Wolpin, An Economic Analysis of Crime and Punishment in England and Wales 1894–1967, 86 J. 
Pol. Econ. 815 (1978). 
54. Allingham and Sandmo label this framework as “the static analysis.” See Allingham 
& Sandmo, supra note 36, at 324–30. 
55. Id. at 324. For a useful review of these assumptions, see, for example, Brian Erard, 
The Influence of Tax Audits on Reporting Behavior, in Why People Pay Taxes 95, 96 (Joel Slem-
rod ed., 1992) (“In these models, taxpayers are already aware of the (exogenous) probability 
of audit and detection; they know their true taxable incomes; and they are familiar with the 
penalties for noncompliance.”). 
56. Allingham and Sandmo take the common assumption that taxpayers’ behavior 
conforms to the Von Neumann-Morgenstern axioms for behavior under uncertainty where 
individuals’ cardinal utility function is increasing and concave, featuring income as its only 
parameter. Marginal utility is assumed to be positive and decreasing, so that taxpayers are 
generally risk averse. In other words, at some point, the taxpayer would not opt for evasion 
12
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payer’s actual income is exogenously given and is known to the 
taxpayer but not to the government’s tax collector.57 Tax is assumed 
to be levied at a proportional rate on declared income, which 
represents the taxpayer’s decision variable.58 With some constant 
probability, the tax authority may investigate the taxpayer and re-
veal the actual amount of her income.59 If this happens, the 
taxpayer would have to pay tax on any amount of undeclared in-
come at a penalty rate that is higher than the tax rate.60 Finally, the 
decision whether to evade or comply is analyzed as if it is the only 
dilemma with which the taxpayer is concerned,61 and the analysis 
ignores possible inter-relationships between this decision and other 
economic choices the taxpayer may face including, for example, 
decisions concerning labor supply and tax avoidance.62 The basic 
A-S analysis also assumes that time is composed of a single period63 
and that only one form of evasion is available.64  
Patterned after the utilitarian paradigm, the taxpayer is taken to 
follow expected utility theory and make compliance decisions 
based solely on the consequences for her net income.65 The A-S 
framework accordingly implies that the taxpayer is tempted to seize 
the opportunity of cheating on her taxes whenever it is worth the 
chance of being caught and bearing the associated penalties.66 The 
                                                   
despite likely increases in expected utility because the risk would be too high for her taste. 
See Allingham & Sandmo, supra note 36, at 324.  
57. Id. at 324. We can assume, more realistically, that part of the taxpayer’s income is 
known to the government such as due to information provided by third party reporting. In 
this case, the analysis would apply to that portion of the income that remains unknown, 
because it would not pay for the taxpayer to try to avoid taxes on the known part. See id. at 
324 n.1; see also, e.g., infra notes 98–99 and accompanying text.  
58. Id. at 324. 
59. Id. 
60. Id. But see Shlomo Yitzhaki, A Note on Income Tax Evasion: A Theoretical Analysis, 3 J. 
Pub. Econ. 201 (1974) (modifying the analysis such that the taxpayer pays penalty on the 
amount of tax missing due to evasion (rather than on undeclared income), a practice that is 
common in countries such as United States and Israel). 
61. Allingham & Sandmo, supra note 36, at 323–32. 
62. Id. at 323. 
63. Cf. id. at 332–37 (laying out the dynamic case); see also Cowell, supra note 35, at 240 
(explaining that with regard to the basic A-S model, one can imagine that each year essen-
tially the same gamble takes place without there being any “memory” in the system). 
64. See Allingham & Sandmo, supra note 36, at 324. 
65. Id. 
66. The taxpayer has a choice between two main strategies: She may declare her in-
come in full or she may declare less than that amount; in the latter case, she will also need to 
decide what portion of her income to declare and what portion to conceal. If the taxpayer 
chooses to conceal some or all of her income, her payoff will depend not only on her deci-
sion regarding whether and to what extent to evade taxes, but also on whether she is 
investigated by the tax authorities and becomes subject to some or all of the associated pen-
alties. The taxpayer is therefore confronted with a classic dilemma of choice under 
uncertainty, which has also been described as a “lottery calculation” or a “gamble.” Under 
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taxpayer compares the expected utility gained from evasion—
considering the taxes she will not pay—with the expected cost of 
the penalty—the nominal penalty discounted by the probability 
that this penalty will be imposed.67 If caught, the taxpayer will need 
to pay the penalty for evasion coupled with the shortfall in tax. 
When the net expected value of evasion is positive, the taxpayer 
will evade, and, when it is negative, she will comply.68 
Examining the relationship among the taxpayer’s (1) actual in-
come, (2) her tax rate, (3) penalty rate, (4) probability of detection, 
and (5) tax evasion, the Allingham and Sandmo analysis leads to 
results that partly contradict available compliance data, suggesting 
that there is no clear relationship among actual income, the tax 
rate, and evasion.69 However, the results for the penalty rate for eva-
                                                   
such conditions, the taxpayer’s failure to report her true income may not necessarily sub-
ject her to the full extent of the law. Therefore evasion is not always an irrational course 
of action. If the taxpayer is not investigated, she is better off when evading than when being 
honest. If she is investigated and punished, she might be worse off—depending on the se-
verity of the penalty imposed. See Cowell, supra note 35, at 231–33. In this context, an audit, 
for example, “is simply an instance of a taxpayer losing the ‘tax lottery.’ ” Erard, supra note 
55, at 96. 
67. See, e.g., Joel Slemrod & Shlomo Yitzhaki, Tax Avoidance, Evasion, and Administration, 
in 3 Handbook of Public Economics 1423, 1451–52 (Alan J. Auerbach & Martin Feldstein 
eds., 2002); Becker, supra note 41, at 176 (arguing that taxpayers consider expected penal-
ties rather than nominal ones).  
68. Consider an example given by John Carroll where a taxpayer contemplates an ille-
gal deduction that reduces the tax she must pay by $100 and where the probability of an 
audit is estimated to be 5 percent. If audited, the taxpayer would have to pay the $100 plus a 
penalty of 50 percent of the income owed, here $50. To simplify the example, Carroll ig-
nores interest rates and treats the taxpayer as risk-neutral. According to this scenario, the 
analysis would involve two main alternatives: (1) not taking the deduction, in which case the 
result is some initial amount of income, W, and (2) taking the deduction. There are two 
possible outcomes to taking the deduction: (1) W plus $100 if the taxpayer is not audited, 
and (2) W minus $50 if she is audited and punished. The expected utility of being honest is 
U(W), and the expected utility of cheating is .95[U(W+100)]+.05[U(W-50)]. As a point of 
reference for a risk-neutral taxpayer, Carroll conveniently assumes that U(W)=0 and that 
U(W+X)=X, so that the expected utility of being honest is 0 compared to 92.5 for cheating 
(.95 x 100 – .05 x 50). With the expected utility significantly higher for noncompliance 
compared with compliance, the taxpayer in this example is expected to cheat. Carroll, supra 
note 9, at 229–30.  
69. Allingham & Sandmo, supra note 36, at 329–30. As Sandmo explains, in the origi-
nal A-S model an increase of the tax rate has an ambiguous effect on tax evasion because 
there is an income effect which is negative: higher taxes make the taxpayer poorer and, 
therefore, less willing to take risks. But there is also a substitution effect that works in the 
direction of increased evasion. The substitution effect on evasion in the A-S model occurs 
because the net penalty (i.e., the difference between the penalty rate and the tax rate) goes 
down when the tax rate increases due to the fact that the penalty rate is held fixed when the 
tax rate increases. The decrease in the net penalty in effect increases the incentive to under-
report income. This substitution effect would be present under the more general but weaker 
assumption that the penalty rate increases less than proportionally with the tax rate. See 
Agnar Sandmo, The Theory of Tax Evasion: A Retrospective View, 58 Nat’l Tax J. 643, 647–48 
(2005). However, if the fine is imposed on the evaded tax (instead of on the evaded income) 
the substitution effect disappears because the penalty increases with the tax rate. In this 
14
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sion and the probability of detection are unambiguous. The A-S model 
confirms Becker’s analysis in finding that a higher penalty rate or 
probability of detection tends to discourage evasion.70 While the 
expected tax yield falls with a decrease in the probability of detec-
tion, the loss of tax revenue can generally be compensated by an 
increase in penalty rate, such that the two enforcement alternatives 
emerge as substitutes for one another.71  
C. The Economic Analysis of Tax Compliance: Beyond the 
Allingham-Sandmo Model 
The economic approach to tax compliance, as it appears in the 
A-S framework, reduces enforcement policies to two key considera-
tions: the penalty rate and the probability of detection. In other 
words, the A-S analysis suggests that in order to control evasion, 
detection has to be stepped up, penalties need to be increased, or 
both. While this conclusion generally provides an intuitively ap-
pealing approach for addressing the tax evasion phenomena, real-
world tax compliance and enforcement mechanisms are much 
                                                   
case, there remains only an income effect, which establishes a negative relationship between 
the tax rate and evasion. Yitzhaki, supra note 60. In other words, if absolute risk aversion 
decreases as income increases, higher tax rates should lead to greater income declarations 
and a reduction in evasion. Unfortunately, this result goes against common intuition about 
the relationship between the marginal tax rate and evasion according to which an increase 
in tax rate provides a greater incentive to evade. It also goes against much of the empirical 
evidence indicating a strong positive association between marginal tax rates and evasion. For 
surveys of empirical work in this area see Sandmo, supra, at 647 n.8. Similarly, when it comes 
to the relationship between actual income and evasion, a higher gross income should in-
crease evasion if individuals are more willing to engage in risky activities as they become 
richer and have more money to spare and/or shelter from taxation. Id. at 647. According to 
Erling Eide, “[t]he reason why increases in various incomes and gains increases crime is that 
punishment in the case of decreasing absolute risk aversion produces a smaller reduction in 
expected (total) income. For risk-neutral people an increase in the probability or severity of 
punishment and a decrease in the gains to crime will reduce the supply of crime, whereas 
changes in exogenous income, and in the remuneration of legal activity have no effect. 
Here, changes in the latter income components do not change the bite of punishment.” 
Eide, supra note 45, at 350–51. But see id. at 348 (“For the common assumption of decreasing 
absolute risk aversion an individual will allocate a larger proportion of his income to tax 
cheating the higher his exogenous income and the higher the gains from crime.”). 
70. See Allingham & Sandmo, supra note 36, at 330. These two variables are of particu-
lar interest for policy purposes since “[t]he former is a parameter over which the tax 
authority exercises direct control; [while] the latter it may be assumed to control indirectly 
through the amount and efficiency of resources spent on detecting tax evasion.” Id.  
71. Id. at 330. This result supports the gambling analogy where rational gamblers take 
fewer risks if the odds are worsened, suggesting that adjustments to either the detection or 
punishment parameter can have a restraining impact on evasion. See supra note 66. 
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more complex than this analysis suggests.72 Efforts to add the nec-
essary depth and realism to the study of tax compliance have 
resulted in the A-S framework being the subject of considerable 
research over the past three and a half decades.  
Early attempts to add credibility to the A-S analysis are already 
evident in the original 1972 article where Allingham and Sandmo 
briefly analyze a dynamic case of tax evasion that incorporated an 
element of time.73 These efforts continued with later models that 
depart from the static framework—in which the taxpayer makes only 
one tax report independent from past or future tax filings—and 
embrace a more realistic framework whereby the taxpayer makes a 
sequence of interdependent tax filings.74 This modification to the 
basic A-S model of evasion is necessary because real-life 
enforcement decisions are not made in isolation. For instance, once 
a taxpayer is discovered to have cheated, the authorities are likely 
to investigate her honesty for other periods.75 Similarly, because 
income tax reporting is normally an annual event, the taxpayer is 
expected to make a decision regarding her present and future re-
ports based on what she has learned from past reporting and 
auditing experiences.76  
Another important development in the A-S framework involves 
efforts to further endogenize the probability of detection. Alling-
ham and Sandmo originally assumed the probability of detection 
                                                   
72. See, e.g., Allingham & Sandmo, supra note 36, at 324–25 (“This formal representa-
tion of the taxpayer’s choice situation is in some ways a significant simplification of his real 
world situation; in particular, the present formulation ignores some of the uncertainty ele-
ments. [For example,] it abstracts from the fact that the tax laws to some extent leave it to 
the discretion of the courts to determine [the type of penalty levied]” and even that the 
penalty rate “may itself be uncertain from the point of view of the taxpayer.”); cf. Dick J. 
Hessing, Henk Elffers, Henry S. J. Robben & Paul Webley, Does Deterrence Deter? Measuring the 
Effect of Deterrence on Tax Compliance in Field Studies and Experimental Studies, in Why People 
Pay Taxes 291, 291 (Joel Slemrod ed., 1992) (referring to Allingham and Sandmo’s effort to 
incorporate risk aversion, reputation, and time into their analysis and stating that “the [A-S] 
model is not quite as simple as has sometimes been claimed.”). 
73. Allingham & Sandmo, supra note 36, at 333 (“The purpose . . . is to investigate the 
dynamic rather than the comparative static aspects of his declarations: for example whether 
for fixed parameters (tax rates, etc.) his declarations will increase or decrease over time, 
rather than whether in a fixed period the declaration will increase or decrase [sic] if a pa-
rameter is changed.”). For more information on Allingham and Sandmo’s dynamic analysis, 
see id. at 332–37. 
74. See, e.g., Eduardo M.R.A. Engel & James R. Hines, Jr., Understanding Tax Evasion Dy-
namics (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 6903, 1999), available at http:// 
www.nber.org/papers/W6903; Joseph Greenberg, Avoiding Tax Avoidance: A (Repeated) Game-
Theoretic Approach, 32 J. Econ. Theory 1 (1984); Michael Landsberger & Isaac Meilijson, 
Incentive Generating State Dependent Penalty System, 19 J. Pub. Econ. 333 (1982). 
75. Allingham & Sandmo, supra note 36, at 333. 
76. Andreoni et al., supra note 12, at 824. 
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to be exogenous to the taxpayer.77 However, as suggested above, 
actual audit probability is not random or fixed and generally de-
pends on the particular characteristics of the taxpayer. To give one 
example, in the United States, the IRS develops formulas for select-
ing returns to audit based on their likelihood to contain 
noncompliant items, and it also often focuses on the potential to 
maximize enforcement revenue by means of audit adjustments.78 
For these reasons, audit rates vary across taxpayers. Returns of 
high-income individuals are generally examined more frequently 
compared to those with lower incomes, and larger corporations are 
examined more often than smaller ones.79  
Based on the relationship evident in real-world enforcement be-
tween taxpayers’ income levels and their audit probability, 
commentators on the A-S analysis suggested further modifying the 
analysis so that the probability of audit will not be fixed but rather 
become a dynamic function of reported income and evasion.80 
Building on this suggestion, another mode of analysis emerged 
that relaxes the unrealistic assumption according to which taxpay-
ers and the tax administration ignore each other’s actions. In the 
modified analysis, the model treats the interaction between taxpay-
ers and the tax administration more as a strategic game—where 
each party makes the best response to the other’s strategy in light 
of available information—than a static gamble.81  
                                                   
77. Allingham & Sandmo, supra note 36, at 331. Note the dissatisfaction that Alling-
ham and Sandmo expressed with respect to this feature of their 1972 analysis (“This may not 
be entirely satisfactory, but a natural hypothesis on the nature of the dependence does not 
immediately suggest itself.”). Id.  
78. Robert E. Brown & Mark J. Mazur, The National Research Program: Measuring Taxpayer 
Compliance Comprehensively, 51 U. Kan. L. Rev. 1255, 1262–64, 1267 (2002). 
79. See, e.g., id. at 1266–67 (discussing the process of case-building); see also Allen Ken-
ney, Everson Touts Increased IRS Enforcement in Fiscal 2004, 105 Tax Notes 1071, 1071 (2004). 
80. See, e.g., Michael J. Graetz, Jennifer F. Reinganum & Louis L. Wilde, The Tax Com-
pliance Game: Toward an Interactive Theory of Law Enforcement, 2 J.L. Econ. & Org. 1 (1986); 
Jennifer F. Reinganum & Louis L. Wilde, Equilibrium Verification and Reporting Policies in a 
Model of Tax Compliance, 27 Int’l Econ. Rev. 739 (1986); Jennifer F. Reinganum & Louis L. 
Wilde, Income Tax Compliance in a Principal-Agent Framework, 26 J. Pub. Econ. 1 (1985). 
81. In this game, the IRS’ aim is to maximize revenue collected while the taxpayer re-
sponds by deciding how much of her income to report. This approach to modeling 
compliance results in two basic classes of models according to the timing in which the tax 
authority can credibly commit to an audit strategy. In the first group of models, the tax 
agency announces and commits to an audit strategy using a cut-off rule before the taxpayers 
file their returns. All returns reporting an income below the cut-off point are audited with 
probability one, whereas those who report a higher income are not audited at all. In the 
second group of models, the tax agency does not commit to an audit strategy prior to the 
filing session, but instead decides which taxpayers to audit after all returns have been filed 
and based on the information they reveal. This class of models takes the form of a sequen-
tial-move game with a number of possible equilibriums. See sources cited supra note 80. For a 
useful review of these models, see Andreoni et al., supra note 12, at 827–831. 
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One final variation of the A-S model worth paying attention to 
incorporates labor-supply decisions as endogenous to the tax-
payer’s gross income.82 This type of model recognizes that “[i]t is 
unreasonable to believe that the taxpayer has not thought about 
the possibility of evading taxes before he sits down to fill out his 
income tax return”83 and that “[m]ore probably, he has thought 
about this [matter] before making decisions about the allocation 
of his work and leisure hours or about the composition of his in-
vestment portfolio.”84 Accordingly, models that incorporate labor-
supply decisions look beyond the basic A-S framework which offers 
two behavioral responses—evasion or compliance—and consider 
that the taxpayer may respond to taxation in other ways. These re-
sponses generally include changing work effort, altering 
consumption and savings decisions, and choosing legal (compared 
to illegal) tax reduction strategies.85 Models in this group usually 
focus on how variables such as the tax and wage rates affects the 
taxpayer’s responses and the manner in which any one response 
affect the others.86 Unfortunately, though this type of model adds 
realism to the analysis of tax compliance, incorporating labor-
supply considerations makes uncertain the effect of changing the 
enforcement variables, thus eliminating the relatively simple com-
putations of the original A-S framework. As a result, “[d]epending 
on the taxpayer’s marginal disutility from labor and her risk atti-
tudes, all predictions become possible.”87  
In an effort to obtain a more thorough understanding of tax 
compliance, researchers continue to develop credible models that, 
among other things, examine the role tax practitioners play in 
compliance; extend the number of items on which taxpayers re-
port; and also address the possible impact of tax morale, justice, 
and fairness considerations on taxpayer behavior.88 Despite these 
expansions and others, the focus of the economic analysis of tax 
compliance on only two key enforcement measures, punishment 
and detection, remains unsatisfactory and not on a par with real-
                                                   
82. See, e.g., John H. Pencavel, A Note on Income Tax Evasion, Labor Supply, and Nonlinear 
Tax Schedules, 12 J. Pub. Econ. 115 (1979); Frank A. Cowell, Taxation and Labour Supply with 
Risky Activities, 48 Economica 365 (1981). 
83. Sandmo, supra note 69, at 651. 
84. Id. 
85. Slemrod & Yitzhaki, supra note 67, at 1436. 
86. Id. 
87. Franzoni, supra note 4, at 58. 
88. For a few examples, see Andrew D. Cuccia, The Effects of Increased Sanctions on Paid 
Preparers: Integrating Economic and Psychological Factors, 16(1) J. of Am. Tax. Assoc. 41 (1994); 
Brian Erard & Jonathan S. Feinstein, The Role of Moral Sentiments and Audit Perceptions in Tax 
Compliance, 49 Pub. Fin./Finances Publiques 70 (Supp. 1994); Steven Klepper & Daniel 
Nagin, The Role of Tax Preparers in Tax Compliance, 22 Policy Sciences 167 (1989). 
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world enforcement practices or needs. Furthermore, the underly-
ing assumption of the economics of compliance—that every 
taxpayer is engaged in some type of rational calculation where she 
will conceal income as long as the return on noncompliance is 
positive—does not neatly coincide with observed behavior.89 Ac-
cording to survey information, the majority of people consider 
themselves to be honest in their tax reporting,90 and presumably 
they are, if the estimated noncompliance rate of 16.3 percent is 
accurate.91 In fact, it has repeatedly been suggested in the tax com-
pliance literature that “[g]iven the current mild sanctions and low 
probability of detection . . . [one] would predict that virtually eve-
ryone should be evading tax.”92 In other words, instead of asking 
“Why do people evade taxes?” we should be asking “Why do people 
pay them?”.93 
The next Part of this Article will explore the strengths and short-
comings of the economics of crime view of compliance, 
particularly as it relates to tax enforcement. It will also evaluate the 
merits of the query commonly raised on the reasons behind the 
observed, high levels of taxpayer compliance. The Article will then 
make a case for developing a more comprehensive interpretation 
of taxpayer behavior in order to better understand tax compliance 
and address noncompliance. 
                                                   
89. See, e.g., Michael J. Graetz & Louis L. Wilde, The Economics of Tax Compliance: Fact 
and Fantasy, 38 Nat’l Tax J. 355, 358 (1985) (“Application of the standard economic theory 
of crime to tax avoidance cases . . . produces an unambiguous prediction of behavior: 
throughout the 1970s no one should have paid the taxes they owed . . . .”); see also Alfred 
Blumstein, Model for Structuring Taxpayer Compliance, in Income Tax Compliance: A Report 
of the ABA Section of Taxation, Invitational Conference on Income Tax Compli-
ance 159, 160–61 (1983) (making the point that the penalties for overstating deductions or 
failing to report income are too low to deter potential evaders); Jonathan Skinner & Joel 
Slemrod, An Economic Perspective on Tax Evasion, 38 Nat’l Tax J. 345 (1985); Kent W. Smith 
& Karyl A. Kinsey, Understanding Taxpaying Behavior: A Conceptual Framework with Implications 
for Research, 21 Law & Soc. Rev. 639 (1987). It is important, however, to distinguish between 
different categories of income that, if underreported, are not subject to the same probability 
of detection. For example, wage income is typically reported by the employer, and an at-
tempt to underreport it by the taxpayer would, therefore, be detected with high probability. 
In that case the economic model predicts that there will be no attempt at evasion, a predic-
tion that is generally supported by available compliance data. See infra note 98 and 
accompanying text. Moreover, a taxpayer’s subjective assessment of the probability of audit is 
not necessary equal to the actual audit rate. In fact, studies indicate that most people overes-
timate the probability of detection, and this could go some way toward explaining non-
evading behavior. See, e.g., James Alm, Gary H. McClelland & William D. Schulze, Why Do 
people Pay Taxes?, 48 J. Pub. Econ. 21 (1992). 
90. Michael Wenzel, Misperceptions of Social Norms About Tax Compliance (1): A Prestudy 
(Ctr. for Tax Sys. Integrity, Austl. Nat’l Univ., Working Paper No. 7, 2001), available at 
http://ctsi.anu.edu.au/publications/WP/7.pdf. 
91. See The Tax Gap, supra note 7. 
92. Hessing, et al., supra note 72, at 292 (citations omitted). 
93. Id. 
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III. An Expanded View of Taxpayer Behavior  
A. A Closer Look at Enforcement Strategies: 
Deterrence and General Prevention 
Empirical and experimental studies tend to support the eco-
nomic model of compliance to the extent that they generally 
identify a negative relationship between the probability and sever-
ity of punishment and the rate of crime. In other words, an 
increase in either the probability or the severity of punishment can 
change the expected utility of noncompliance from positive to 
negative, thereby deterring potential offenders and, overall, de-
creasing the level of crime.94 This effect has also been identified in 
the area of tax compliance.95 The correlation between increased 
enforcement and compliance appears to be stronger, however, 
when the probability of detection is increased than when the pun-
ishment is made more severe.96 In either case, enforcement efforts 
relying exclusively on punitive strategies do not always alleviate the 
problem of noncompliance and, at times, might even worsen the 
situation.97  
More specifically, tax enforcement findings generally support 
the conclusion that taxpayers are highly responsive to perceived or 
actual risk of detection in their compliance decisions. According to 
IRS estimates, compliance is most likely where the risk of detection 
is significant, such as where third-party reporting or withholding 
exists. Approximately one percent of all wage, salary, and tip in-
come is misreported, contributing about $10 billion to the tax 
gap.98 In contrast, non-farm sole proprietor income, which is sub-
ject to little third-party reporting or withholding, has a significantly 
                                                   
94. See, e.g., Eide, supra note 45, at 355–60 (reviewing empirical studies). 
95. See, e.g., Paul J. Beck, Jon S. Davis & Woonoh Jung, Experimental Evidence on Taxpayer 
Reporting Under Uncertainty, 66 Acct. Rev. 535 (1991); Charles T. Clotfelter, Tax Evasion and 
Tax Rates: An Analysis of Individual Returns, 65 Rev. Econ. & Stat. 363 (1983); Nehemiah 
Friedland, Shlomo Maital & Aryeh Rutenberg, A Simulation Study of Income Tax Evasion, 10 J. 
Pub. Econ. 107 (1978); Ann D. Witte & Diane F. Woodbury, The Effect of Tax Laws and Tax 
Administration on Tax Compliance: The Case of the U.S. Individual Income Tax, 38 Nat’l Tax. J. 1 
(1985). These findings are not entirely conclusive. For a review of additional studies and 
some contradictory results, see Hessing, et al., supra note 72. 
96. See, e.g., Becker, supra note 41, at 176 (“[A] change in the probability has a greater 
effect on the number of offenses than a change in the punishment. . . .”) (citing Lord 
Shawness (1965) (“Some judges preoccupy themselves with methods of punishment. This is 
their job. But in preventing crime it is of less significance than they like to think. Certainty 
of detection is far more important than severity of punishment.”)); see also Dan M. Kahan, 
Social Influence, Social Meaning, and Deterrence, 83 Va. L. Rev. 349, 380 (1997). 
97. See infra text accompanying notes 106–119. 
98. I.R.S. News Release IR-2006-28, supra note 4. 
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higher rate of misreporting at approximately 57 percent, which 
contributes about $68 billion to the tax gap.99  
In terms of the punishment parameter, fines and other types of 
penalties also generally improve compliance. However, when it 
comes to real-life behavior, minor adjustments in penalty rates are 
likely to go unnoticed and so not to affect compliance.100 Some re-
searchers go as far as to argue that heavy penalties do not always 
produce better compliance results compared with lighter ones, es-
pecially when detection probability is high.101 In certain studies, the 
effect of an increase in the severity of punishment is not statistically 
significant, and a statistically significant positive effect on criminal 
behavior is also occasionally identified.102 Ultimately, penalties gen-
erally serve as less of a deterrent for committing crimes than the 
probability of detection. Edward Cheng summarizes this point 
nicely, reporting that the effect of deterrence tends to decrease 
rapidly and nonlinearly with lower probabilities of enforcement, 
and tougher punishments are often unable to offset these losses.103  
Despite the heightened deterrent effect of detection compared 
with punishment, a concern for low-cost tax administration may 
lead policymakers to favor raising penalties over increasing costly 
detection to improve compliance. In other words, given a fixed 
enforcement budget, efforts to maximize deterrence and raise the 
most revenue at minimal cost might dictate extreme but rare pun-
ishments.104 To this end, one might especially endorse fines and 
other monetary sanctions rather than more resource-intensive 
forms of punishment, such as imprisonment and probation.105 
                                                   
99. Id.; see also Leandra Lederman, Statutory Speed Bumps: The Roles Third Parties Play in 
Tax Compliance, 60 Stan. L. Rev. 695 (2007) (stressing the role statutory mechanisms play in 
inducing compliant results); Kagan, supra note 29 (finding that compliance with the tax law 
is high for items that are most visible such as interest income and salary subject to withhold-
ing, but low for items that have little or no “paper trail” such as cash transactions, different 
types of business expenses, or charitable contributions).  
100. Edward K. Cheng, Structural Laws and the Puzzle of Regulating Behavior, 100 Nw. U. L. 
Rev. 655, 659 (2006).  
101. See, e.g., Nehemia Friedland, A Note on Tax Evasion as a Function of the Quality of In-
formation About the Magnitude and Credibility of Threatened Fines: Some Preliminary Research, 12 J. 
Applied Soc. Psychol. 54 (1982). 
102. Eide, supra note 45, at 358–60 (reviewing literature).  
103. Cheng, supra note 100, at 659–60. 
104. See, e.g., Becker, supra note 41, at 180–81; see also Sandmo, supra note 69, at 648 
(arguing in a different context that in the modeling literature of policy optimization, it is 
usually assumed that the collection agency’s objective is to maximize revenue raised). 
105. See, e.g., Becker, supra note 38, at 391 (“Fines are preferable to imprisonment and 
other types of punishment because they can deter crimes effectively if criminals have sufficient 
financial resources . . . . Moreover, fines are more efficient than other methods because the 
cost to offenders is also revenue to the state.”). Note that one underlying assumption here 
might be that if extreme punishment is effective in creating a deterrence force, there will be 
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Unfortunately, however, even when effective in improving com-
pliance, an enforcement strategy of extreme and rare penalties 
might still be a poor strategic choice because of the repercussions 
that are likely to accompany it. For example, rare and extreme 
punishments can provoke community outrage. The idea that the 
government doles out just punishment is undermined when ex-
treme sanctions are disproportionably imposed on lesser 
offenses.106 And when it comes to serious crimes, inflicting heavy 
penalties on the rare few that are caught is arbitrary, draconic, and 
highly discriminatory.107 Such an approach could lead to underen-
forcement as tax administrators become conflicted between their 
legal obligations and moral judgment.108 Imposing rare but severe 
sanctions may also result in an increase in the severity of crimes 
committed as offenders realize that the sanctions imposed will be 
extreme regardless of the actual offence committed and attempt to 
maximize their gain from crime.109 With extreme consequences for 
noncompliance, the possibility of erroneous penalties and the pun-
ishment of those who violate the law because of ignorance or 
honest mistake also becomes particularly disturbing.  
To be sure, taking any form of punitive enforcement to an ex-
treme threatens the democratic nature of society and carries a risk 
of inflaming a broader conflict between citizens and the govern-
ment. Such an approach to tax enforcement might set the tone for 
a taxpayer-tax authority relationship that is dominated by feelings 
of antagonism and distrust.110 This type of interaction is likely to 
“crowd out” whatever intrinsic motivations taxpayers have to com-
                                                   
no actual need to impose penalties because people will be compliant. This, however, does 
not mean that such an approach is politically or socially acceptable, feasible, or credible.  
106. See, e.g., Sandmo, supra note 69, at 660 (“[F]or penalties to be socially acceptable, 
they probably must be set so that in the eyes of the general public, they ‘fit the crime.’ ”). 
107. Cheng, supra note 100, at 660. 
108. See, e.g., Dan M. Kahan, Gentle Nudges vs. Hard Shoves: Solving the Sticky Norms Prob-
lem, 67 U. Chi. L. Rev. 607, 608 (2000). 
109. Cowell, supra note 35, at 249–50. 
110. See, e.g. Bruno S. Frey, Not Just for the Money: An Economic Theory of Per-
sonal Motivations (1997); Bruno S. Frey, A Constitution for Knaves Crowds Out Civic Virtues, 
107 Econ. J. 1043 (1997); Lars P. Feld & Bruno S. Frey, Tax Compliance as the Result of a Psy-
chological Tax Contract: The Role of Incentives and Responsive Regulation, 29 Law & Pol’y 102 
(2007); see also Lars P. Feld & Bruno S. Frey, Tax Evasion in Switzerland: The Role of Deterrence 
and Tax Morale (Ctr. For Res. in Econ., Mgmt. & Arts, Working Paper No. 2006-13, 2006), 
available at http://www.crema-research.ch/papers/2006-13.pdf; Bruno S. Frey & Lars P. 
Feld, Deterrence and Morale in Taxation: An Empirical Analysis (CESifo, Working Paper No. 760, 
2002) [hereinafter Frey & Feld, 2002 Working Paper], available at http://www.cesifo-
group.de/~DocCIDL/760.pdf. 
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ply with their tax obligations and might also lead them to actively 
resist paying their taxes, either legally or illegally.111 
From an economic perspective, even when an increase in en-
forcement is feasible, conducive to democratic values, and results 
in an increase in compliance, it might still be suboptimal to raise 
these efforts to the maximum.112 Enforcement expenditures repre-
sent a real cost to the economy, while the revenue collected can be 
viewed as a mere transfer from the private to the public sector.113 
Furthermore, increased enforcement of the tax system can also 
have disincentive effects similar to an increase in tax rates and base 
and should therefore be handled with caution and restraint.114 Fi-
nally, in addition to the considerations that counsel against 
                                                   
111. See, e.g., Frey & Feld, 2002 Working Paper, supra note 110 (analyzing 1970–1995 tax 
compliance data from 26 Swiss cantons and finding that taxpayers respond in a systematic 
way to how the tax authority treats them. In particular, taxpayers’ willingness to pay their 
taxes, or their tax morale, is supported, or even raised, when tax officials treat them with 
respect. In contrast, an emphasis on authoritarian means to force taxpayers pay their dues 
generally leads to a distrust of citizens and a crowding out of tax morale, translating to lower 
levels of tax compliance); see also Lars P. Feld & Bruno S. Frey, Trust Breeds Trust: How Taxpay-
ers Are Treated, 3 Economics of Governance 87 (2002). In this context, noncompliance is 
particularly likely when taxpayers view the use of threat and legal authority to be illegitimate 
or unreasonable. This may involve administrative disrespect for taxpayers or an arbitrary 
refusal to take their concerns into account in the enforcement process. See e.g., Eugene 
Bardach & Robert A. Kagan, Going by the Book: The Problem of Regulatory Unrea-
sonableness (1982); see also Ayres & Braithwaite, supra note 26; E. Allan Lind & Tom R. 
Tyler, The Social Psychology of Procedural Justice (1988); Tom R. Tyler, Why Peo-
ple Obey the Law (1990); Robert A. Kagan & John T. Scholz, The Criminology of Corporation 
and Regulatory Enforcement Strategies, in Enforcing Regulation 67 (Keith Hawkins & John 
M. Thomas eds., 1984). Several authors have written on the possibility of harmful effects of 
punitive enforcement in tax more generally. See, e.g., Valerie Braithwaite & John Braithwaite, 
An Evolving Compliance Model for Tax Enforcement, in Crimes of Privilege: Readings in 
White-Collar Crime 405, 406 (Neal Shover & John Paul Wright eds., 2001) (“Tax en-
forcement is an area where the effects of deterrence and compliance approaches are 
unknown. When taxpayers are audited, for example, and a penalty is imposed, it is unclear 
whether they learn that they got away with a lot of things that the audit did not detect . . . . 
Sometimes an audit succeeds in deterring cheating in the long run, but in the year or two 
after audit taxpayers believe they are unlikely to be audited, and this has a dramatic negative 
effect on compliance in those two years.” (internal citation omitted)); Carroll, supra note 9, 
at 234 (“[A]udits, withholding, and reporting requirements, and ‘Big Brother’ data files that 
cross-check taxpayers with reports of income sources, charities, utility companies, and so 
forth seem necessary to increase the risk of detection. However, such tactics may only create 
a larger under-ground economy and less visible ways to cheat.”); Karyl A. Kinsey, Theories and 
Models of Tax Cheating, in 18 Crim. Just. Abstracts 402, 416 (1986) (arguing that deter-
rence-based tools like tax audits frequently backfire by teaching tax cheaters how much is 
being overlooked by the tax administration).  
112. In this context, raising enforcement to the maximum means increasing enforce-
ment until one dollar spent yields one dollar in revenue.  
113. Slemrod, supra note 10, at 1–2. 
114. Id.; cf. Franzoni, supra note 4, at 62 (suggesting that it is not obvious that curbing 
or eliminating evasion is necessarily a desirable goal since such efforts might be economi-
cally unsound in potentially shutting down beneficial economic activities that cannot bear 
the cost of taxation). 
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extreme enforcement, empirical evidence suggests that even such 
moderate means may fail to effectively promote compliance. When 
researchers tested the rate and probability of punishment at mod-
erate levels, consistent with those observed in actual tax 
enforcement, they found the deterrent effects to be quite small.115  
Taken as a whole, the findings suggest that a broad enforcement 
approach, where detection and punishment become complemen-
tary strategies, rather than extreme substitutions, and more 
importantly, where nonpunitive enforcement mechanisms are also 
considered, might be a superior alternative to relying only on au-
thoritarian deterrence. In fact, enforcement efforts that rely 
exclusively on punitive measures and the severity and probability of 
punishment are likely to be short-sighted at best and counterpro-
ductive at worst. Taxpayers adapt, take up new strategies of 
noncompliance, and become increasingly sophisticated in their 
risk assessment of being caught and penalized for wrongdoing.116 
In an area as complex and controversial as tax, legalistic and au-
thoritarian attempts at shaping behavior lead to a never-ending 
process, as efforts to address one type of undesirable behavior 
leave countless others unattended.117 A broader, more constructive 
and forward looking definition of deterrence than the one 
adopted by the traditional economic analysis of tax compliance 
ought to look beyond the use of threat and legal authority. It 
should encompass other factors and mechanisms that offer a pre-
ventive force against crime. 
The literature of crime has generally interpreted preventative 
measures as a way to take into consideration the external conditions 
that affect law-abiding norms and morals in addition to the direct 
monetary costs and benefits attached to compliant and noncompli-
ant choices.118 Read in this light, an expansive characterization of 
                                                   
115. James Alm, Betty Jackson & Michael McKee, Deterrence and Beyond: Toward a Kinder, 
Gentler IRS, in Why People Pay Taxes 311, 322–23 (Joel Slemrod ed., 1992). 
116. Carroll, supra note 9, at 258 (indicating that evidence of people’s behavioral adap-
tations to undermine increased enforcement is available in a wide range of regulatory areas, 
including with respect to shoplifting, drunk driving, and family violence). But see Cheng, 
supra note 100, at 668 (“[W]hen searching for solutions to undesirable conduct, legislatures 
naturally incline toward establishing new rules that prohibit and punish the conduct. The 
machinery—police, prosecutors, courts, prisons—is already in place; the legislature might as 
well use it.”). 
117. Doreen McBarnet, When Compliance is Not the Solution but the Problem: From Changes 
in Law to Changes in Attitude, in Taxing Democracy: Understanding Tax Avoidance and 
Evasion 229 (Valerie Braithwaite ed., 2003); Valerie Braithwaite, Dancing with Tax Authorities: 
Motivational Postures and Non-compliant Actions, in Taxing Democracy: Understanding Tax 
Avoidance and Evasion 15, 15 (Valerie Braithwaite ed., 2003). See generally Braithwaite & 
Braithwaite, supra note 111, at 406–07.  
118. Eide, supra note 45, at 353. 
24
Law & Economics Working Papers Archive: 2003-2009, Art. 64 [2009]
http://repository.law.umich.edu/law_econ_archive/art64
Leviner FTP Paginated 1_C.doc  2/20/2009 8:27 AM 
Winter 2009] A New Era of Tax Enforcement 405 
 
deterrence would seek to improve tax compliance not only by 
means of adversely curbing illegal activity but also by constructively 
fostering legal behavior, such as by balancing punitive deterrence 
with education, encouragement and assistance so as to facilitate a 
broad base for taxpayer compliance. A familiar practice in regula-
tory programs generally, this balanced approach is considered a 
particularly appropriate technique in complex areas like taxation. 
In these areas where compliance is notoriously difficult and not 
always in the short-term self-interest of the regulated, the very clas-
sification and detection of noncompliance become challenging as 
well.119 
B. The Multiplicity of Taxpayer Behavior 
“Common sense and everyday observations tell us that people refrain 
from tax evasion—as well as from speeding, shoplifting, and pollut-
ing the environment—not only from their estimates of the expected 
penalty, but for reasons that have to do with social and moral consid-
erations.” 120  
 
Human behavior is multifaceted and it is influenced by many 
factors. In the context of taxation, taxpayers’ disposition toward 
public institutions, ethics, morals and norms, as well as the per-
ceived fairness of the tax system are all highly instrumental in 
shaping behavior.121 Moreover, enforcement policies themselves are 
more complex than mere combinations of penalties and audit 
                                                   
119. Kent W. Smith, Reciprocity and Fairness: Positive Incentives for Tax Compliance, in Why 
People Pay Taxes 223, 223 (Joel Slemrod, ed., 1992) (stating that deterrence based on the 
detection and punishment of offenses is only one aspect of most enforcement and regula-
tory programs and that a mix of strategies has been found in several studies of regulatory 
agencies and the police).  
120. Sandmo, supra note 69, at 649–50. 
121. Some academics suggest, for example, that taxpayers may not process personal 
consequences, but, instead, focus on doing the “right thing”—determined from legal, 
moral, social, utilitarian, or personal consequence viewpoints—leading to a “norm-
processing” rather than an “outcome-processing” model of decision making. See, e.g., John S. 
Carroll, How Taxpayers Think about Their Taxes: Frames and Values, in Why People Pay Taxes 
43, 47 (Joel Slemrod ed., 1992); see also Benno Torgler, Tax Compliance and Tax Mo-
rale: A Theoretical and Empirical Analysis (2007) (developing the concept of tax 
morale as an inherent affinity of taxpayers to comply with their tax obligation and exploring 
a broad range of parameters affecting this affinity); 2 Taxpayer Compliance (Jeffrey A. 
Roth & John T. Scholz eds., 1989) (examining social science perspectives and influences 
related to taxpayer compliance); Richard D. Schwartz & Sonya Orleans, On Legal Sanctions, 
34 U. Chi. L. Rev. 274, 281–82 (1967) (finding that taxpayer compliance and, particularly, 
the reaction taxpayers have to different enforcement mechanisms depends, to some extent, 
on these taxpayers’ socio-economic characteristics). 
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probabilities. Institutional and procedural factors, such as tax ad-
ministrators, tax courts, and tax advisors, as well as the manner in 
which these bodies interact with the taxpayer community, affect tax 
compliance.122 The standard economic analysis tends to shy away 
from accounting for the effect these various determinants have on 
compliance. Increasingly, however, scholars have begun collecting 
empirical evidence on the role nonmonetary parameters play in 
shaping taxpaying behavior generally, and improving tax compli-
ance and constraining noncompliance in particular. At the same 
time, there have been growing attempts to incorporate these pa-
rameters into the more formal economic analysis.  
The traditional economic literature on tax compliance examines 
taxpayer behavior through the decisions of a single individual.123 
Set in this way, the analysis falls short of putting the issue of tax 
compliance in its broader societal setting and, consequently, misses 
important explanatory opportunities. One example of this over-
sight is the limited range of goods examined in the standard 
analysis, which tends to portray individuals as concerned only with 
their private consumption while displaying total disregard for pub-
lic goods and services.124 Evidence, however, shows that taxpayer 
behavior depends not only on private consumption capacity but 
also on what taxpayers believe they obtain from public goods and 
services. Taxpayers expect to receive some return on the taxes they 
pay, and, not only do they care about these returns, but they also 
evaluate whether the tradeoff is equitable compared to what other 
taxpayers appear to receive.125 Alm et al., for example, find greater 
willingness to comply with the tax law among taxpayers who believe 
they benefit from public goods.126 Spicer and Becker find that indi-
viduals who are told their taxes are heavier than others evade by 
                                                   
122. For example, when taxpayers are asked to justify their tax evasion, they commonly 
respond by saying that they have been treated unfairly by the tax system. Although this an-
swer can be regarded as a mere defense of one’s own self-interested behavior, it may also 
indicate that taxpayers take into account institutional and environmental factors that go 
beyond the probability and severity of punishment. See Sandmo, supra note 69, at 651; see also 
Alm et al., supra note 115, at 313 (“[D]etection and punishment cannot explain the compli-
ance behavior of all individuals. The percentage of tax returns that are subject to detailed 
audit is quite small in most countries, and penalties are seldom more than a fraction of 
unpaid taxes. . . . However, compliance in many counties remains relatively high. Additional 
factors must play a role—perhaps a dominant one—in tax compliance.” (footnote omit-
ted)); supra note 89 and accompanying text. 
123. See supra note 52 and accompanying text. 
124. Cowell, supra note 35, at 240. 
125. In fact, there is some evidence to suggest that perceptions of individual incomes 
may play less of a role than perceptions of fairness and social outcomes associated with the 
tax law. See, e.g., Steenbergen et al., supra note 39. 
126. James Alm, Betty R. Jackson & Michael McKee, Estimating the Determinants of Tax-
payer Compliance with Experimental Data, 45 Nat’l Tax J. 107 (1992). 
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relatively high amounts, while those who are told their taxes are 
lower than others evade by relatively small amounts.127  
One study that compared the impact various information 
sources have on taxpayers found that social influence and, specifi-
cally, perceived attitudes toward noncompliance of those people 
with whom taxpayers discuss taxes have the strongest impact on 
these taxpayers’ commitment to comply with their tax obliga-
tions.128 That is, taxpayers’ commitment to paying taxes is affected 
not only by what taxpayers believe they receive for paying taxes and 
by their relative gain or loss in consumption compared to that of 
others, but it may mostly be impacted by social interaction and the 
extent to which noncompliance is perceived to be prevalent in the 
taxpayers’ social environment. When taxpayers believe that people 
around them generally cheat, they are more likely to cheat them-
selves, and when taxpayers believe others are usually honest, they are 
more willing to pay their own taxes honestly.129 It becomes clear, 
therefore, that taxpaying behavior is not only the result of isolated 
calculations of the immediate monetary costs and benefits taxpayers 
expect to incur from compliance as opposed to noncompliance. 
Taxpaying behavior is also a collective process where information, 
experiences, attitudes, and patterns of behavior are shared among 
taxpayers, impacting their assessments of costs and benefits and, 
consequently, their compliance with the tax law.  
Some scholars go as far as to argue that moral, ethical, and so-
cietal factors play a role in compliance that may be more important 
                                                   
127. Michael W. Spicer & Lee A. Becker, Fiscal Inequity and Tax Evasion: An Experimental 
Approach, 33 Nat’l Tax J. 171 (1980). Even though there is evidence that perceived ine-
qualities in the tax system are related to noncompliance, the evidence is not entirely 
conclusive. For example, Paul Webley et al., Tax Evasion: An Experimental Approach 
(1991), reached an opposite conclusion from Spicer and Becker. However, Robert Mason & 
Lyle D. Calvin, Public Confidence and Admitted Tax Evasion, 37 Nat’l Tax J. 489 (1984), found 
that dissatisfaction with the tax system is not directly related to reported noncompliance but 
that it changes other attitudes and beliefs that may impact compliance. For further analysis 
of these findings see Cowell, supra note 9, at 219–20; Andreoni et al., supra note 12, at 851. 
128. John T. Scholz, Kathleen M. McGraw & Marco R. Steenbergen, Will Taxpayers Ever 
Like Taxes: Responses to the U.S. Tax Reform Act of 1986, 13 J. Econ. Psychol. 625 (1992); see 
also Steenbergen et al., supra note 39. 
129. See, e.g., sources cited supra note 128; see also Cowell, supra note 9, at 101–24; John 
T. Scholz, Trust, Taxes, and Compliance, in Trust and Governance 135 (Valerie Braithwaite 
& Margaret Levi eds., 1998). When taxpayers see that others disregard statutory taxes, creat-
ing an unjust disparity in the allocation of the tax burden or leading to a reduction in the 
quality or quantity of public goods and services, they may rationalize resisting payment of 
their own taxes. Andreoni et al., supra note 12, at 851; cf. Robert H. Frank, Choosing the 
Right Pond: Human Behavior and the Quest for Status (1985) (discussing the role of 
relative standing as key in shaping individuals’ perceptions of well-being and, consequently, 
the actions they take). 
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than the threat of legal punishment.130 Grasmick and Scott find, for 
example, that, while the relationship between the threat of legal 
punishment and intention to evade taxes is statistically significant, 
anticipated feelings of guilt and social stigma attached to tax eva-
sion are more strongly associated with deterrence.131 Similarly, 
Mason and Mason argue that an appeal to taxpayer conscience or 
civic virtue can improve tax compliance more than the threat of 
legal sanctions.132 Other scholars, such as Blumental et al., Leandra 
Lederman, and Alex Raskolnikov, clarify that detection and pun-
ishment could be complementary strategies to moral, ethical, and 
social appeals, especially when they are applied to different groups 
of taxpayers.133  
Notwithstanding the issue of how much weight to assign to vari-
ous enforcement considerations, the mere incorporation of 
nonmonetary parameters and influencers into the traditional eco-
nomic analysis of tax compliance often results in a better 
description of real-world taxpaying behavior than a theory built 
only on selfish monetary assumptions.134 Staying within the eco-
nomic paradigm, the rationality proposition no longer implies 
narrow materialism or pure self-interest. Instead, rationality now 
reflects the reality that most taxpayers are constrained by a range 
of considerations and that these considerations lead them to obey 
the tax law when the sum of all potential costs of noncompliance, 
                                                   
130. See, e.g., Dan M. Kahan, Trust, Collective Action, and Law, 81 B.U. L. Rev. 333 (2001); 
see also Steenbergen et al., supra note 39, at 32 (concluding that perceptions of individual 
outcomes played less of a role than perceptions of individual fairness and social outcomes 
associated with the 1986 Tax Reform Act). 
131. Harold G. Grasmick & Wilbur J. Scott, Tax Evasion and Mechanisms of Social Control: 
A Comparison with Grand and Petty Theft, 2 J. Econ. Psychol. 213 (1982) (suggesting that 
policies increasing the sense of moral duty to obey the law among taxpayers may signifi-
cantly improve compliance). 
132. Laurie Mason & Robert Mason, A Moral Appeal for Taxpayer Compliance: The Case for 
a Mass Media Campaign, 14 Law & Pol’y 381, 394 (1992). 
133. Marsha Blumenthal, Charles Christian & Joel Slemrod, Do Normative Appeals Affect 
Tax Compliance? Evidence from a Controlled Experiment in Minnesota, 54 Nat’l Tax J. 125 (2001); 
Joel Slemrod, Marsha Blumenthal & Charles Christian, Taxpayer Response to an Increased Prob-
ability of Audit: Evidence from a Controlled Experiment in Minnesota, 79 J. Pub. Econ. 455 (2001); 
Leandra Lederman, The Interplay Between Norms and Enforcement in Tax Compliance, 64 Ohio 
St. L.J. 1453 (2003); Alex Raskolnikov, Relational Tax Planning Under Risk-Based Rules, 156 U. 
Pa. L. Rev. 1181 (2008); see also Kristina Murphy & Karen Byng, Preliminary Findings from The 
Australian Tax System Survey of Tax Scheme Investors (Ctr. For Tax Sys. Integrity, Austl. Nat’l 
Univ., Working Paper No. 40, 2002), available at http://ctsi.anu.edu.au/publications/ 
WP/40.pdf. 
134. Note, for example, the incorporation of reputation already in the A-S analysis. Al-
lingham & Sandmo, supra note 36, at 332–37; see also, e.g., Erard & Feinstein, supra note 88 
(adding guilt and shame into the analysis of evasion).  
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including likely moral, ethical, and social sanctions, outweigh the 
expected gain.135  
In sum, although the standard economic approach to compliance 
serves as a useful starting point for understanding taxpayer behavior, 
the overly narrow focus of this framework restricts its utility. Ulti-
mately, this approach might lead policymakers to reach misguided 
conclusions that require enforcement that is too punitive such that 
it becomes politically unsound and counterproductive in its effect 
on compliance. Fortunately, as the above discussion reveals, real-
world tax administration does not implement effective levels of de-
terrence and yet compliance rates remain generally high. This 
suggests that when it comes to the behavior of the taxpayer, motives 
other than the desire to maximize one’s net income must be con-
sidered. Extending the analysis of tax compliance to consider such 
additional motives requires developing a better understanding of 
the many influencers on taxpayer behavior and the manner in 
which enforcement policy can properly and effectively address 
them. Researchers and administrators in Australia have been in-
volved in this particular line of investigation during the past 
decade, with results that bear important implications for the en-
forcement of tax compliance in Australia, as well as in other 
industrialized countries and regulatory areas. 
The next Part will review the research in motivations and, par-
ticularly, those motivational influencers identified to be most 
commonly associated with taxpaying behavior. The Article will then 
introduce the concept of responsive regulation and explore the 
manner in which this approach to regulation brings key elements 
of enforcement together to foster tax compliance.  
                                                   
135. Cf. Becker, supra note 38, at 385–86 (“[T]he economic approach I refer to does 
not assume that individuals are motivated solely by selfishness or material gain. It is a method 
of analysis, not an assumption about particular motivations. Along with others, I have tried 
to pry economists away from narrow assumptions about self-interest. Behavior is driven by a 
much richer set of values and preferences. The analysis assumes that individuals maximize 
welfare as they conceive it, whether they be selfish, altruistic, loyal, spiteful, or masochistic.”). 
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IV. The Australian Approach to Tax Enforcement 
A. Motivational Postures: Attitudes, Behavior, 
and Service Delivery 
“Regulating people through understanding the simultaneous emer-
gence and retreat of various postures means that at the most 
fundamental level, regulation rests on the art of managing relation-
ships.” 136  
Innovative research in regulation has identified a group of moti-
vational influencers, best known today as “motivational postures,” 
that capture the way regulated entities position and think about 
themselves in relation to the regulatory authority.137 The basic prin-
ciple behind the concept of motivational postures is that the 
beliefs, values, and attitudes of regulated actors lead them to adopt 
a particular posture (or stance) toward the regulator.138 In the con-
text of compliance with tax law, motivational postures capture the 
manner in which taxpayers see themselves as they relate to the tax 
system and its administration and, particularly, the amount of so-
cial distance they wish to place between themselves and these 
functions.139 This distance indicates the taxpayers’ degree of accep-
                                                   
136. Braithwaite, supra note 117, at 21. 
137. See Valerie Braithwaite, Games of Engagement: Postures within the Regulatory Community, 
17 Law & Pol’y 225 (1995); Valerie Braithwaite, John Braithwaite, Diane Gibson & Toni 
Makkai, Regulatory Styles, Motivational Postures and Nursing Home Compliance, 16 Law & Pol’y 
363 (1994). People possess many beliefs, values, and attitudes that are often multi-
dimensional, difficult to identify, and may appear to be inherently contradictory, especially 
when they translate to behavior. When it comes to strategic planning of enforcement, what 
researchers found to be helpful in understanding and determining the motivational influ-
encers for taxpaying behavior was looking at motivations not in the abstract but in relation 
to adherence to the regulatory authority. See Cash Economy Task Force 1998, supra note 
27, at 22–24, app.1 at 61–62 (1998); Braithwaite, supra note 117, at 24 (“Motivational pos-
tures are proving to be useful markers of degree of consent, cooperation and commitment 
that underlies the human system as it comes into contact with the administrative/technical 
tax system.”).  
138. Braithwaite, supra note 117, at 17–18 (explaining that individuals and groups regu-
larly evaluate authorities in terms of what they stand for and how they perform). Over time, 
beliefs and attitudes for the authority are developed; they are socially shared and chal-
lenged. Individuals then develop rationalizations for their feelings and use values and 
ideologies to justify the motivational posture they possess. Braithwaite & Braithwaite, supra 
note 111, at 410 (“Motives shape the values and attitudes we publicly espouse to defend our 
position to ourselves and others. We all approach regulators with our own world view of how 
we want to and ought to engage with the regulatory system.” (internal citation omitted)). 
139. Bogardus uses the term “social distance” to refer to the degree to which individuals 
or groups have positive feelings toward other ethnic groups and attribute status to them. 
Emory S. Bogardus, Immigration and Race Attitudes (1928). The contemporary work 
in motivational postures, however, examines the concept of social distance in the context of 
the regulator-regulated relationship. See supra note 137 and accompanying text. 
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tance or rejection of the tax authority and, accordingly, the extent 
to which these taxpayers are open to the authority’s influence.140  
Strategies for inducing compliance are likely to vary in their ef-
fectiveness depending on the motivational posture of the targeted 
taxpayers. In other words, different regulatory and enforcement 
measures can be successful when dealing with taxpayers who see 
themselves as law-abiding citizens versus those taxpayers who see 
themselves as opportunistic. Moreover, taxpayers who feel the tax 
administration has insulted or treated them disrespectfully may 
respond differently to particular enforcement mechanisms than 
taxpayers who feel that the tax authority has treated them with dig-
nity and that it acts with integrity and legitimacy.141 For this reason, 
tax administrations that seek to understand the taxpayers’ full 
range of motivational influencers may be better situated to effec-
tively target and encourage taxpayers to “do the right thing” and 
comply with their tax obligations, while at the same time retaining 
the capacity to monitor and constrain those motivations that might 
lead taxpayers down the path of noncompliance.142  
Five key motivational postures have been identified as relevant 
to the realm of tax compliance. These are: (1) commitment, 
(2) capitulation, (3) resistance, (4) disengagement, and (5) game 
playing.143 The first two postures, commitment and capitulation, 
are compliant in nature, the former more than the latter. They 
suggest the taxpayers’ cooperative interaction with and acceptance 
of the tax system and authority.144 The latter three postures, 
                                                   
140. Motivational postures can be viewed as indicators for the degree to which the tax-
payer identifies herself to be a full participant in the tax system and her resulted 
susceptibility to the influence of its administration. This will reflect on the taxpayer inclina-
tion to not only comply with existing rules and regulations but also cooperate once these are 
reformed. Braithwaite, supra note 117, at 18; see also Valerie Braithwaite & Jenny Job, The 
Theoretical Base for the ATO Compliance Model 1, 10 (Ctr. for Tax Sys. Integrity, Austl. Nat’l 
Univ., Research Note 5, 2004), available at http://ctsi.anu.edu.au/publications/RN5.pdf. 
141. See, e.g., Cash Economy Task Force 1998, supra note 27, app.1 at 61–62; Michael 
Wenzel, The Multiplicity of Taxpayer Identities and Their Implications for Tax Ethics, 29 Law & 
Pol’y 31 (2007); cf. Carroll, supra note 121, at 48. 
142. Cash Economy Task Force 1998, supra note 27, at 23, app.1 at 62. 
143. Id. at 22–24 (discussing the first four postures). For complementary reviews, see 
Braithwaite, supra note 117, at 18; Braithwaite & Braithwaite, supra note 111, at 410–11. See 
generally supra note 137 and infra note 145. For variations of the Australian model, note that 
in New Zealand, for example, the tax administration adopted a compliance model similar to 
the Australian one but featuring only four postures. In the New Zealand model, game-
playing was taken to be a potential subcategory within each of the other four postures. See 
Tony Morris & Michele Lonsdale, Translating the Compliance Model into Practical Reality, in 
2004 Proceedings of the Internal Revenue Serv. Research Conference 57, 61–62 
(2005). 
144. Valerie Braithwaite, A New Approach to Tax Compliance, in Taxing Democracy: Un-
derstanding Tax Avoidance and Evasion 1, 3 (Valerie Braithwaite ed., 2003); Cash 
Economy Task Force 1998, supra note 27, at 21.  
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resistance, disengagement, and game playing, represent 
increasingly defiant states of mind with the taxpayers’ growing 
distance and dislike toward the tax authority, the system of 
taxation, and what taxpayers perceive they stand for.145  
When commitment and capitulation are high, the tax admini-
stration is more likely to gain compliance from taxpayers. The 
posture of commitment expresses the taxpayers’ understanding 
that the tax administration is a necessary institution for democracy 
and suggests a feeling of moral obligation to advance the common 
good and voluntarily pay due taxes.146 Capitulation reflects accep-
tance of the tax authority and its officials as legitimate and the belief 
that they are positively responsive to taxpayers as long as taxpayers 
behave according to the law and obey the authorities.147 However, 
when the defiant postures of resistance, disengagement, and game 
playing are dominant, things are rather different. As Valerie 
Braithwaite, a leading scholar in the research in motivational 
postures, explains: defiant postures are likely to coincide with feel-
ings of being threatened by the tax system or administration, low 
satisfaction with democracy, anti-government and pro-market atti-
tudes, relatively weak identification with being a citizen and an 
honest taxpayer, higher than average investment in aggressive tax 
planning, and a desire to abolish the tax system.148 Taxpayers who 
hold defiant postures are consequently more likely to be unaf-
                                                   
145. See, e.g. Braithwaite, supra note 144, at 3–4; Cash Economy Task Force 1998, supra 
note 144. Taxpayers usually have a basic “comfort zone” that reflects their general stance 
toward the tax administration and the law. However, motivational postures are the result of a 
dynamic interaction between the taxpayer and the administration. Accordingly, the taxpayer 
can demonstrate more than one posture in any specific encounter, and she may also vary 
her attitude depending on the nature of a given interaction. There is some compatibility 
among the postures. Commitment and capitulation are generally compatible so that where 
they exist, disengagement and resistance are unlikely to be present. Disengagement is more 
compatible with resistance and game playing. According to Valerie Braithwaite, none of 
these correlations, however, is sufficiently high to conclude that taxpayers can be placed on 
a simple adversarial-cooperative dimension. See Braithwaite, supra note 117, at 22–24; see also 
Valerie Braithwaite, The Community Hopes, Fears and Actions Survey: Goals and Measures (Ctr. 
for Tax Sys. Integrity, Austl. Nat’l Univ., Working Paper No. 2, 2001), available at 
http://ctsi.anu.edu.au/publications/WP/2.pdf; Valerie Braithwaite, Monika Reinhart, Mal-
colm Mearns & Rachelle Graham, Preliminary Findings from the Community Hopes, Fears and 
Actions Survey (Ctr. for Tax Sys. Integrity, Austl. Nat’l Univ., Working Paper No. 3, 2001), 
available at http://ctsi.anu.edu.au/publications/WP/3.pdf; Valerie Braithwaite, Kristina 
Murphy & Monika Reinhart, Taxation Threat, Motivational Postures, and Responsive Regulation, 
29 Law & Policy 137 (2007). 
146. See, e.g., Braithwaite & Braithwaite, supra note 111, at 411. 
147. Id. 
148. Braithwaite, supra note 117, at 24. 
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fected by persuasion, or by the traditional punitive measures of be-
ing caught and punished for noncompliance.149  
Resistance, the first defiant posture, reflects the taxpayers’ dis-
trust over the tax authority’s commitment to cooperate with and be 
respectful of them.150 These taxpayers may be watchful and feel the 
need to fight for their rights or otherwise curb the power of the tax 
administration.151 Disengagement is a more extreme attitude that 
stems from the taxpayers’ deep disenchantment with the tax system 
and its administration.152 The main objective of disengaged taxpay-
ers becomes withdrawal from any interaction with the tax 
administration rather than challenge its authority.153 By mentally 
positioning themselves outside the regulatory reach, the disen-
gaged can further that end and cut themselves off from attempts of 
persuasion and influence. This makes it extremely difficult for the 
tax administration to gain compliance.154  
The final defiant posture is game-playing. With a game-playing 
posture, taxpayers view the law as something to respect or ignore 
depending on which approach better advances their self-interest.155 
Unlike disengagement, game-playing remains bounded within the 
regulatory realm. However, rather than comply with the spirit of the 
law, players use the letter of the law to de facto undermine its 
intent.156 The existing literature suggests that traditionally, elite 
groups have most commonly practiced this posture.157 However, as 
                                                   
149. Id. (explaining that persuasion measures may include, for example, education and 
open dialogue). 
150. See, e.g., Braithwaite & Braithwaite, supra note 111, at 411. 
151. Id. 
152. Braithwaite & Job, supra note 140, at 10–11. 
153. Braithwaite, supra note 117, at 18. 
154. Existing research indicates that disengagement is generally the posture most diffi-
cult for authorities to manage. See e.g., Braithwaite et al., supra note 137, at 383–84; see also 
Braithwaite & Job, supra note 140, at 11 (making the point that when the taxpayer cuts her-
self off from the authority, the only regulatory option left to the authority is to make 
noncompliance impossible). 
155. McBarnet, supra note 117, at 229–33. The game playing posture emerged from dis-
cussions with tax officials and taxpayers over matters of compliance. Although this type of 
behavior has been previously studied in the context of economic regulation, it has yet to be 
extensively examined in other regulatory contexts, especially by social scientists. See Braith-
waite, supra note 117, at 18–19; Valerie Braithwaite, Monika Reinhart & Jason McCrae, Game 
Playing with Tax Law (Ctr. for Tax Sys. Integrity, Austl. Nat’l Univ., Research Note 8, 2004), 
available at http://ctsi.anu.edu.au/publications/RN8.pdf. 
156. McBarnet, supra note 117, at 229–33. With “disengagement and game playing,” 
“[c]itizens see the power of government as irrelevant to their lives. The choice is whether 
they acknowledge the authority or step outside its reach.” Braithwaite & Job, supra note 140, 
at 10. 
157. Thirteen percent of the recipients of the 2000 national survey conducted by the 
Centre for Tax System Integrity at the Australian National University were identified as game 
players. On the other hand, approximately ninety-two percent of the survey respondents 
indicated the posture of commitment and seventy-three percent recognized the posture of 
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aggressive tax avoidance strategies become increasingly available to, 
and acceptable by, the general public, the game-playing mindset is 
likely to spread and become a more serious problem for 
enforcement.158 
The more committed people are to paying taxes, the less likely 
they are to put effort into tax minimization strategies. The postures 
most strongly associated with aggressive forms of tax avoidance are 
game-playing and resistance, while evasion is a more likely option 
for those who are resistant or disengaged.159 However, being com-
mitted or capitulated does not necessarily prevent taxpayers from 
misconduct. Behavior is the result of a variety of inputs, only some 
of which are related to beliefs and attitudes, and so, consistency 
between mental states and behavior should not automatically be 
assumed.160 The tax administration must acknowledge the disparity 
                                                   
capitulation in themselves. Fifty-five percent of the respondents reported holding a resis-
tance posture. Least pervasive was disengagement with only seven percent of respondents 
identifying themselves that way. Braithwaite, supra note 117, at 23, and 19–24 more generally 
(providing a brief analysis of the 2000 Community Hopes, Fears and Actions Survey).  
158. See, e.g., Braithwaite & Braithwaite, supra note 111, at 406–07 (“Increasingly, the 
problem for large business firms is not tax evasion, but adoption of sophisticated strategies 
for circumventing tax laws . . . . [W]hat is true for the largest corporations is also true for the 
wealthiest individuals.”). Braithwaite & Braithwaite report that the accounting firms in the 
United States once known as the “Big Five” have been able to increase their profits substan-
tially through offering their clients more aggressive tax minimization strategies. They 
indicate, for example, that Ernst & Young and Deloitte & Touche reported a 29 percent 
jump in their profits from tax service in the United States in 1997 and, overall, between 
1993 and early 2000, tax revenue for the Big Five has grown at twice the pace of audit reve-
nue. The worry with these expansions is that they will trigger a race to the bottom where 
other players will assume that adopting aggressive tax practices is the only way to stay com-
petitive. Id.; see also Braithwaite & Job, supra note 140, at 11 (arguing that “[t]he public 
response of dissociation [of taxpayer from the tax authority and their tax obligations] has 
the potential for posing a major threat to the regulatory effectiveness of tax authorities, and 
more broadly democratic governance.”). The game playing posture is a reminder that com-
pliance itself could become a problem when it is defined as compliance with rules as written. 
Doreen McBarnet suggests that in the context of taxation the goal for enforcement ought to 
be securing long-term compliance with the intent—rather than with the black letter—of the 
law. Doreen McBarnet, The Construction of Compliance and the Challenge for Control: The Limits of 
Noncompliance Research, in Why People Pay Taxes 333 (Joel Slemrod ed., 1992); see also Kris-
tina Murphy, Regulating More Effectively: The Relationship Between Procedural Justice, Legitimacy, 
and Tax Non-compliance, 32 J.L. & Soc’y 562, 564 (2005). 
159. Braithwaite, supra note 117, at 33 (discussing the findings from the Australian 2000 
Community Hopes, Fears and Actions Survey); cf. Paul Webley et al., supra note 127 (finding 
that taxpayers who indicate alienation from or negative attitudes toward laws and the gov-
ernment are considerably more likely to engage in evasion). For a discussion on the 
relationship between attitudes and behavior more generally, see infra notes 161–164 and 
accompanying text.  
160. Braithwaite, supra note 117, at 35 (“All too often, authorities make the assumption 
of consistency between attitude and behavior: People who do the wrong thing are bound to 
be nasty pieces of work, and need to be treated like the villains they are.”). In fact, empirical 
evidence indicates that the relationship between motivational postures and behavior is em-
pirically weak in that motivational postures do not, necessarily, lead to acts of obedience or 
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between motivational postures and taxpayer behavior and be cog-
nizant and responsive to both in order to promote compliance. 
Crucially, the administration does not only serve as a passive ob-
server of the behavior and attitudes of taxpayers, but it also affects 
them considerably.  
It is well understood today that the perceptions taxpayers have 
of the procedural justice of the tax system—how the tax admini-
stration treats them and other similarly situated taxpayers—affect 
the legitimacy these taxpayers attribute to the administration and 
the extent to which they accept its authority.161 This, in turn, im-
pacts the taxpayers’ levels of compliance. Taxpayers who believe 
that the tax administration and its officials make an effort to be fair 
and respectful are more likely than those with more negative per-
ceptions to assign greater legitimacy to the tax system, align with its 
administration, and, consequently, comply with their tax obliga-
tions.162 Further, positive behavior by the tax administration 
increases the likelihood of compliance because of the tendency for 
people to react in a like manner to behavior they experience from 
others.163 In accordance with this rule of reciprocity, helpful and 
                                                   
disobedience. Disparities between the motivational postures taxpayers hold and the compli-
ance-related actions they take are also likely to reflect environmental conditions such as 
reference groups and the nature of the interaction between taxpayers and the tax admini-
stration. Id. at 16–17, 33 (commenting that inconsistencies between postures and behavior 
goes against the expectation that attitudes and behavior be related and consistent and that 
such an expectation implies rationality, comprehension, and thought that are not always 
present in human behavior. In fact, the conceptualization of attitudes and behavior as dis-
tinct is in keeping with empirical findings in the area of tax enforcement as well as the 
broader realm of human behavior). 
161. See, e.g., Lind & Tyler, supra note 111; Tyler, supra note 111; Tom R. Tyler & 
Kathleen M. McGraw, Ideology and the Interpretation of Personal Experience: Procedural Justice and 
Political Quiescence, 42 J. Soc. Issues 115 (1986); Tom R. Tyler, Justice, Self-Interest, and the 
Legitimacy of Legal and Political Authority, in Beyond Self-Interest 171, 171 (Jane J. Mans-
bridge ed., 1990). 
162. See Tyler, supra note 111 (for the general relation between perceptions of proce-
dural justice, legitimacy and obedience to the law). For taxpayer behavior, see Cowell, 
supra note 9 (reviewing the attitudinal and experimental literatures and finding that indi-
vidual attitudes and perceptions of the tax system are generally related to compliant 
behavior); Murphy & Byng, supra note 133; Kristina Murphy, Turning Resistance into Compli-
ance: Evidence from a Longitudinal Study of Tax Scheme Investors (Ctr. For Tax Sys. Integrity, 
Austl. Nat’l Univ., Working Paper No. 77, 2005), available at http://ctsi.anu.edu.au/ 
publications/WP/77.pdf (analyzing 2002 and 2004 survey data in the case of Australian 
taxpayers who were caught investing in mass marketed tax schemes in the late 1990s. Ac-
cording to the analysis, tax scheme investors who were more likely to think the 2002 
settlement offer extended by the Australian Tax Office was fair were less likely to hold onto 
resistant views toward the ATO and more likely to be compliant with their tax obligations in 
2004). 
163. Smith, supra note 119, at 225 (citations omitted); see also Cash Economy Task 
Force 1998, supra note 27, app.1 at 62 (indicating that, ideally, if the tax authority treats the 
taxpayer with fairness and respect, the taxpayer will try to comply because it is “the right 
thing to do.”). 
35
Leviner:
Published by University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository, 2009
Leviner FTP Paginated 1_C.doc  2/20/2009 8:27 AM 
416 University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform [Vol. 42:2 
respectful service may also coax a broader normative commitment 
of compliance among taxpayers when they believe that the tax ad-
ministration acts positively toward them as a matter of general 
practice.164  
The result of taxpayer/tax-authority interaction may be differ-
ent, however, for taxpayers who do not trust or respect the tax 
authority or for those who feel deeply threatened by it.165 When 
taxpayers feel uneasy with the tax authority, such as when they an-
ticipate or experience a particularly unpleasant interaction with tax 
officials, these taxpayers might adopt coping mechanisms to pro-
tect themselves against the tax administration’s disapproval.166 
These coping mechanisms often boil down to an acute sense of 
polarization, where taxpayers interpret differences with the tax sys-
tem and its administration as conflicts between “us” and “them.”167 
At this point, a friction, or rift, is likely to emerge between taxpay-
ers and the tax system and its administration.168 When the tax 
administration employs punitive strategies that communicate dis-
approval, this friction is expected to amplify with the rise in 
perceived disapproval, exacerbating feelings of animosity and defi-
ance.169 One key challenge for tax officials in this situation is to 
change the motivational postures taxpayers hold. Tax officials may 
be able do this by offering cooperation, positive and helpful ser-
                                                   
164. Smith, supra note 119, at 227; Lars P. Feld & Bruno S. Frey, Tax Compliance as the Re-
sult of a Psychological Tax Contract: The Role of Incentives and Responsive Regulation, 29 Law & 
Pol’y 102 (2007). For a good discussion of the role that administrative practices play in 
affecting taxpayer compliance, see Leandra Lederman, Tax Compliance and the Reformed IRS, 
51 Kan. L. Rev. 971 (2003). 
165. Taxpayer distrust or hostility toward the tax administration could be the result of 
experiences taxpayers have directly with the tax administration or due to other, indirect 
interactions, such as what taxpayers observe from the experiences of others or based on 
norms and habits of a reference group. Direct contact with the tax administration can be 
gained, for example, while the taxpayer is being audited and resenting the intrusive treat-
ment, or even from the failure to be audited when such failure is viewed as a weakness on 
the part of the administration. Note, for example, that there is evidence to suggest that per-
sonal experience with audits might increase tax resistance. M. W. Spicer & S. B. Lundstedt, 
Understanding Tax Evasion, 31 Pub. Fin./Finances Publiques 295 (1976).  
166. Braithwaite & Job, supra note 140, at 8, 11. 
167. Braithwaite & Braithwaite, supra note 111, at 411–12 (advancing the argument that 
the way to understand the interaction between the taxpayer and the tax administration as 
well as the taxpayer need for a coping mechanism in certain circumstances is through theo-
ries of shame and identity); see also Eliza Ahmed & Valerie Braithwaite, A Need for Emotionally 
Intelligent Policy: Linking Tax Evasion with Higher Education Funding, 10 Legal & Crimino-
logical Psychol. 1 (2005). For a useful review of some of the theories relevant to the 
regulator-regulated relationship, in a different context, see John Braithwaite, Restora-
tive Justice and Responsive Regulation 79–90 (2002). 
168. Braithwaite & Braithwaite, supra note 111, at 411. 
169. Id. at 412. 
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vice, and open dialogue as a first response to conflicts.170 When the 
offer of cooperation is met with compliance by taxpayers, toxic 
feelings, including antagonism, resentment, and distrust, can be 
diffused. This, in turn, enables the tax authority to (re)connect 
with taxpayers on a positive level so as to eventually elicit voluntary 
compliance.171  
In cases where the offer of cooperation from the tax authority is 
not met with compliance, tax officials must be firm, but also fair, in 
bringing to account those who remain defiant. Whatever steps the 
tax administration takes must not, as much as possible, adversely 
affect compliant taxpayers or escalate existing conflicts beyond 
what is necessary to gain compliance.172 Maintaining open commu-
nication and positive and professional service even through the 
toughest encounters with taxpayers becomes instrumental to effec-
tive enforcement. Such strategies not only help protect the 
integrity of the tax system and administration, but they are also 
valuable in order to turn taxpayer resistance into cooperation. Ac-
cording to available evidence, in most cases, even when taxpayers 
hold resentment and anger toward the tax system and administra-
tion, they also hold goodwill that creates an opportunity to draw 
out the more cooperative motivational postures and behaviors.173 
The main question therefore is not whether the tax administration 
should punish taxpayers who are noncompliant. Rather, it is how 
the administration can balance punitive enforcement against 
other, more constructive, measures to address existing noncompli-
ance while also nurture relationships of partnership and 
cooperation with the taxpayer community.174 
The next Part of this Article will draw on the Australian experi-
ence beginning in the late 1990s to suggest that an effective 
approach to achieving taxpayer compliance, mutual respect, and 
sustainable cooperation includes a hierarchy of lesser sanctions 
                                                   
170. Id. (explaining that trying cooperation remains the best first choice for achieving 
the goal of changing motivational postures to more compliant ones but adding that offering 
cooperation to non-compliers may not always be the response that regulators want to make); 
see also supra notes 163–164 and accompanying text (citing literature on reciprocity). 
171. Braithwaite & Braithwaite, supra note 111, at 412. 
172. Cash Economy Task Force 1998, supra note 27, at 57. 
173. For example, according to survey information, while 87 percent of taxpayers who 
were caught investing in mass marketed tax schemes in the late 1990s were highly resistant 
in 2002, about 93 percent of them also articulated clear committed views. Murphy & Byng, 
supra note 133, at 11. For discussions on the transition from taxpayer resistance to coopera-
tion via the implementation of more cooperative and better tailored administrative 
practices, see Murphy, supra note 162, and more generally, Sagit Leviner, An Overview: A New 
Era of Tax Enforcement-From “Big Stick” to Responsive Regulation, 2 Regulation & Governance 
360, 371–72 (2008).  
174. Murphy, supra note 158, at 564, 589. 
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and regulatory interventions, the possibility of severe and certain 
sanctions for noncompliance in the background, and a broad un-
derstanding of taxpayers’ motivational postures. 
B. Responsive Regulation and the Australian Compliance Pyramid 
“Through incentives and threats and public statements of what the 
community considers proper and improper, the law is used as an in-
strument to shape and maintain behavior.” 175  
“The model of the regulatory pyramid suggests regulatory strategies, 
while the social rift model describes the posturing of those subject to regu-
lation. The ATO Compliance Model brings these different sides of the 
regulatory relationship together to summarize the process of conflict esca-
lation, not with the intention of avoiding conflict so much as 
managing it.” 176 
 
Until the mid-1990s, the regulatory style of the Australian Tax Of-
fice, like the regulatory approach of most tax administrations in the 
industrial world, was authoritarian.177 This regulatory method, com-
monly referred to as “enforced compliance” or “command and 
control regulation,” developed out of the economics of crime and 
compliance paradigm. It called for the establishment of optimal, 
clear-cut rules for taxpayers to follow and the forceful enforcement 
of these rules through the threat of detection and legal punish-
ment.178  
Despite its widespread dominance, opponents of command and 
control often argue that this strategy misinterprets human behavior 
and the meaning of noncompliance, and that its one-solution-fits-all 
approach is poorly suited for regulating compliance.179 The many 
complexities of the tax compliance problem suggest the need for a 
comprehensive strategy of enforcement that fosters long-term com-
pliance. Yet “[a]n approach which relies simply on detecting non-
                                                   
175. Carroll, supra note 121, at 44. 
176. Braithwaite & Braithwaite, supra note 111, at 413. 
177. Valerie Braithwaite, A New Approach to Tax Compliance, in Taxing Democracy: Un-
derstanding Tax Avoidance and Evasion 1, 1 (Valerie Braithwaite ed., 2003); Jenny Job & 
David Honaker, Short-Term Experience with Responsive Regulation in the Australian Taxation Office, 
in Taxing Democracy: Understanding Tax Avoidance and Evasion 111, 111–13 (Valerie 
Braithwaite ed., 2003). 
178. Job & Honaker, supra note 177, at 112. 
179. See, e.g., Ayres & Braithwaite, supra note 26; Bardach & Kagan, supra note 111; 
Neil Gunningham & Peter Grabosky, Smart Regulation: Designing Environmental 
Policy (1998); Braithwaite, supra note 167; Malcolm K. Sparrow, The Regulatory 
Craft (2000). 
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compliance and imposing sanctions on detected non-compliers will 
tend to be short term in its effect and increasingly resource inten-
sive.”180 The Australian tax administration took to heart the criticisms 
of the command and control method. With the release of the 1998 
Cash Economy Task Force Report, the administration embraced a 
new approach to enforcement that shifted the regulatory emphasis 
from authoritarian deterrence to a method of responsive regula-
tion.181 
In their 1992 book entitled Responsive Regulation: Transcending the 
Deregulation Debate, Ian Ayres and John Braithwaite conceptualize re-
sponsive regulation as an approach that does not suggest any 
definitive program or a set of perceptions prescribing a single best 
way to regulate. Instead, Ayres and Braithwaite envision responsive 
regulation as a method that advances the proposition that regulation 
should be context-dependent and yield different solutions depend-
ing on the regulatory circumstances at hand.182 An administration 
that adopts responsive regulation commits itself to investigating and 
taking into consideration the problems, motivations, and circum-
stances of the regulated parties. It is an administration that 
emphasizes dynamic operation, assumes commitment to assisting the 
regulated actors in their compliance efforts, and strives to enforce 
compliance across the board, even when the regulated are highly 
resistant.183 At the same time, there is also less reliance on strategies 
that are based only on threat of detection and legal penalties.184 
Ayres and Braithwaite utilize the principles of responsive regula-
tion to offer a holistic model for regulating compliance.185 An 
expanded version of their model was endorsed in the 1998 report of 
the Australian Cash Economy Tax Force, after which it was adopted 
across the board for regulating tax compliance in Australia.186 The 
Australian compliance model is represented by a pyramid with each 
of its three faces articulating one key aspect of compliance.187 These 
include: (1) the motivational postures taxpayers are most likely to 
                                                   
180. Cash Economy Task Force 1998, supra note 27, at 47. 
181. See generally id. The ATO started by examining enforcement in the building and 
construction industries where evidence suggested a high level of cash transactions. See Job & 
Honaker, supra note 177; Neal Shover, Jenny Job & Anne Carroll, The ATO Compliance Model 
in Action: A Case Study of Building and Construction, in Taxing Democracy, Understanding 
Tax Avoidance and Evasion 159 (Valerie Braithwaite ed., 2003). For the concept of re-
sponsive regulation, see generally Ayres & Braithwaite, supra note 26. See also infra notes 
182–184 and accompanying text. 
182. Ayres & Braithwaite, supra note 26, at 5.  
183. Id. at 35–40, 47–51. 
184. Id. at 4–5. 
185. See, e.g., id. at 35–40. 
186. Cash Economy Task Force 1998, supra note 27, at 22–26. 
187. Id. 
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hold toward the tax system and its administration and display in 
their interactions;188 (2) the enforcement strategies at the tax ad-
ministration’s disposal; and (3) corresponding regulatory tools.189 In 
this model, the motivational postures, regulatory measures, and en-
forcement mechanisms have a range of severity. The cooperative 
postures, lenient enforcement strategies, and less intrusive regula-
tory styles are set closer to the base of the pyramid. The areas higher 
on the model are reserved for defiant postures and for harsher and 
more authoritarian enforcement and regulatory practices.190  
The Australian Compliance Pyramid 
 
Adapted from the 1998 Australian Cash Economy Tax Force Report 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                   
188. See supra Part IV.A. 
189. See supra note 186. But see Ayres & Braithwaite, supra note 26, at 36; John Braith-
waite, Large Business and the Compliance Model, in Taxing Democracy, Understanding Tax 
Avoidance and Evasion 177, 178 (Valerie Braithwaite ed., 2003) (explaining that the idea 
behind the compliance model is to offer strategies and knowledge as to how to go about 
enhancing tax compliance. It is not a recipe but a model to guide strategic thinking); see also 
Braithwaite & Braithwaite, supra note 111, at 408–09 (“[What is important] is not the con-
tent of the enforcement pyramid but its form. Different kinds of sanctioning are appropriate 
to different regulatory arenas.”). 
190. Cash Economy Task Force 1998, supra note 27, at 24–26; see also Ayres & 
Braithwaite, supra note 26, at 35–40. 
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The tit-for-tat (TFT) strategy, a familiar practice in law and eco-
nomics and the game theory literature,191 was introduced into the 
compliance model as the actual means for regulating respon-
sively.192 In adopting the compliance model, with its TFT 
methodology, the ATO rejected the more traditional deterrence 
style of enforcement that is grounded in a static calculation of the 
probability of compliance based on the expected size and risk of 
punishment. Now, the ATO seeks to balance positive persuasion 
and encouragement with punitive deterrence and incapacitation in 
a dynamic fashion.193 It embraces the understanding that people 
care about different things in different contexts and that they of-
ten possess multiple—even contradictory—selves: people can have 
a caring, socially-responsible self as well as an opportunistic self. 
Monetary considerations may motivate individuals at one point and 
a sense of social responsibility at another.194 Accordingly, an en-
forcement strategy grounded in punishment or persuasion alone is 
fundamentally deficient as it will either undermine the good will of 
taxpayers or be exploited by their sense of greed.195 Both persua-
sion and punishment have strengths and shortcomings in 
delivering compliance. The key to successful regulation is there-
fore not to decide between one approach or the other but to 
establish a workable compromise between the two such that these 
strategies complement each other.196  
When utilizing the TFT methodology, the tax administration bal-
ances encouragement and persuasion with punitive deterrence 
through three stages of communication with the taxpayer: coop-
eration, toughness, and forgiveness.197 At the heart of this approach 
is the understanding that the tax administration and the taxpayer 
                                                   
191. Robert Axelrod & William D. Hamilton, The Evolution of Cooperation 211 Science 
1390, 1393–94 (1981); Robert Axelrod, The Evolution of Cooperation (1984). 
192. See generally Ayres & Braithwaite, supra note 26, at 19–53. 
193. See, e.g., id. at 51. 
194. Braithwaite, supra note 137. 
195. See generally Braithwaite, supra note 25 (discussing the need and feasibility of bal-
ancing punishment against persuasion in the context of the coal mining industry). See also 
supra note 173 and accompanying text (examining the case of the mass marketed tax 
scheme investors).  
196. Id.; see also Braithwaite & Braithwaite, supra note 111, at 405 (“Decades of research 
on regulatory rule enforcement prompted a battle of sorts between those who favor a deter-
rence approach and those who promote compliance approaches, between punishment and 
persuasion. Now the debate has changed focus to ‘how to get the right mix of the two.’ ”); cf. 
Smith, supra note 119, at 229 (“If a balance of strategies emphasizing both positive incen-
tives and the detection and punishment of non-compliance is to be effective, then the two 
strategies must symbiotically reinforce each other, rather than detract from each other.”). 
197. Ayres & Braithwaite, supra note 26, at 21. The method of balancing positive ser-
vice with punitive deterrence coincides quite nicely with the idea of implementing a 
preventative approach discussed earlier. See supra notes 118–119 and accompanying text. 
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are partners in an ongoing relationship and that they impact and 
affect one another.198 The tax administration therefore works to 
initiate each interaction with the taxpayer at the bottom of the 
compliance pyramid where it assumes the taxpayer holds coopera-
tive postures and accordingly relies on self-regulation and means of 
assistance and encouragement.199 In this way, the tax administration 
first appeals to the social responsibility of the taxpayer in order to 
foster and maintain compliance. The administration aims to culti-
vate relationships of good citizenship, trust and alliance, while 
avoiding the use of unnecessary punitive measures that might un-
dermine the goodwill and intrinsic motivations of the taxpayer to 
voluntarily comply.200 If the taxpayer chooses to cooperate, tax offi-
cials must remain at the bottom of the pyramid and embrace 
cooperation.201 If the taxpayer decides not to cooperate, TFT in-
structs the tax administration to move proportionally higher on the 
model, incrementally generating more authoritarian means of en-
forcement and regulation.202  
By communicating its capacity and willingness to get tougher 
with cheaters, the tax administration taps into the economics of 
crime and compliance paradigm. It raises the cost of noncompli-
ance and encourages the taxpayer to choose her socially 
responsible, law-abiding self over her opportunistic self. This, in 
turn, increases the effectiveness of persuasion and encouragement 
at the bottom of the pyramid.203 However, by implementing the 
TFT strategy, whereby the tax administration is both tough and 
forgiving, the administration does more than merely escalate en-
forcement and regulation in response—and in proportion—to 
taxpayer defiance. It also dynamically manages the relationship 
(and conflicts) with the taxpayer by leaving the option of coopera-
tion always within reach. As soon as the taxpayer chooses 
cooperation, the TFT strategy instructs the tax administration to 
                                                   
198. Accordingly, the TFT strategy commands, among other things, that there be an 
open communication channel between the administration and the taxpayer in which the tax 
authority explains the legal obligations of the taxpayer and the consequences for noncom-
pliance, and that the imposition of these consequences depends on the behavior of the 
taxpayer. Cf. Cash Economy Task Force 1998, supra note 27, at 57; see also Feld & Frey, Tax 
Compliance as the Result of a Psychological Tax Contract, supra note 110 (conceptualizing a psy-
chological contract between the government and taxpayers, in which taxpayers not only 
expect to receive certain returns on the taxes they pay but also for the authorities to treat 
them with dignity and consideration).  
199. Ayres & Braithwaite, supra note 26, at 21; see also Braithwaite, supra note 167, 
at 30. 
200. See supra notes 110–111.  
201. Ayres & Braithwaite, supra note 26, at 21. 
202. Id. 
203. Id. at 26–27. 
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reward cooperative behavior by gradually moving down the pyra-
mid and de-escalating enforcement and regulation.204  
The triangular makeup of the Australian model with its wide 
base and narrow top implies that a substantial proportion of indi-
vidual taxpayers are positioned closer to the bottom of the 
pyramid, or, in other words, that most people generally want to 
comply with their tax obligations.205 Fewer taxpayers are assumed to 
be involved in more serious forms of noncompliance and, there-
fore, located higher on the model.206 Evidence on individual tax 
compliance suggests that these predictions are generally accurate. 
Survey information from the U.S. and Australia indicates, for ex-
ample, that about two-thirds of individual taxpayers intend to pay 
their taxes in full,207 results that are supported by the current level 
of U.S. tax compliance, standing as high as 83.7 percent.208 At the 
same time, however, this evidence suggests that approximately one-
third of taxpayers do not necessarily plan to comply.  
In order to safeguard a culture of obedience to the law, if tax-
payers follow through with noncompliance, sanctions must remain 
severe and certain. The height of the compliance pyramid and its 
array of regulatory and enforcement measures express both the 
ability and willingness of the tax administration to escalate en-
forcement and regulation. This signals to the taxpayer that the 
administration holds a credible commitment “never to give in.”209 
With this commitment, the tax administration communicates to 
taxpayers that it will be cooperative as its first choice but that, if the 
taxpayer resists cooperation, it will use a heavier hand until com-
pliance is gained.210  
                                                   
204. Id. at 21; see also Braithwaite, supra note 167, at 30–31. 
205. Braithwaite, supra note 177, at 5; see also Braithwaite & Job, supra note 140, at 2. 
Compare the case of large corporate compliance displaying more of an age-shaped model 
than a pyramid. Here, most taxpayers will actively seek to minimize their taxes yet generally 
implementing legal, as opposed to illegal means, such that they be located in the midsection 
of the model. Braithwaite, supra note 189, at 179–80.  
206. Braithwaite, supra note 177, at 5. 
207. Braithwaite, supra note 189, at 179 (citation omitted). 
208. See, e.g., supra note 7 and accompanying text. Interestingly, the current rate of com-
pliance remains fairly consistent with the rates estimated almost twenty years ago. 
Lederman, supra note 164, at 1009 (indicating that 1988 U.S. tax compliance rate was 83 
percent). 
209. Ayres & Braithwaite, supra note 26, at 40–41 (adding that “the greater the 
heights of punitiveness to which an agency can escalate, the greater its capacity to push 
regulation down to the cooperative base of the pyramid”). According to Ayres and 
Braithwaite, the most severe enforcement and regulatory strategies should be visible so that 
taxpayers will perceive the tax administration as having an image of great power or “invinci-
bility.” Id. at 44–47; see also Cash Economy Task Force 1998, supra note 27, at 24–25. 
210. See, e.g., Cash Economy Task Force 1998, supra note 27, at 26, app.1 at 63 (sug-
gesting that individual personalities matter less when everyone knows that the role of the 
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In sum, although the Australian approach emphasizes self-
regulation vis-à-vis voluntary compliance, persuasion, and encour-
agement at the bottom of the pyramid, adoption of the compliance 
model does not suggest that the tax administration is reluctant to 
identify and punish noncompliers. However, by first offering coop-
eration rather than disciplinary sanctions, tough enforcement is 
expected to be considered more procedurally fair by taxpayers, 
and this sense of fairness may better promote alignment and coop-
eration with the tax administration.211 Often, the mere knowledge 
of the tax administration’s willingness and capacity to execute se-
vere punishments will enhance taxpayers’ confidence in the tax 
administration and serve as a powerful form of persuasion that fur-
thers a climate of voluntary compliance.212 In the words of Ayres 
and Braithwaite: “[R]egulators will be more able to speak softly 
when they carry big sticks (and, crucially, a hierarchy of lesser sanc-
tions). Paradoxically, the bigger and more various are the sticks, 
the greater the success regulators will achieve by speaking softly.”213  
V. Summary and Conclusions  
“My work may have sometimes assumed too much rationality, but I be-
lieve it has been an antidote to the extensive research that does not 
credit people with enough rationality.” 214  
 
Over the past three and a half decades, understanding the 
causes for and facilitators of taxpayer compliance and noncompli-
ance has been the focus of much analysis in tax administration 
                                                   
regulator is to be cooperative first and then to introduce sanctions only when there is no 
cooperation). However, one may doubt the feasibility of the tax administration to escalate 
and de-escalate enforcement and regulation in everyday situations. See, e.g., Robert Baldwin 
and Julia Black, Really Responsive Regulation, 71(1) The Modern Law Review 59, 63–64 
(2008) (providing a good critic of responsive regulation generally); Gregory Rawlings, Taxes 
and Transactional Treaties: Responsive Regulation and the Reassertion of Offshore Sovereignty, 1 Law 
& Pol’y 51 (2007) (discussing the issue of responsive regulation in the international con-
text. Here, the difficulty of escalating enforcement and regulation is most pronounced when 
dealing with Offshore Finance Centers (OFC) without having strong enforcement capacity 
from the outset. Under such conditions, OFCs can extract protection under state sover-
eignty and the option of bilateral agreements).  
211. See supra notes 110–111, 161. 
212. Ayres & Braithwaite, supra note 26, at 40–51; Cash Economy Task Force 1998, 
supra note 27, at 25; cf. Steven M. Sheffrin & Robert K. Triest, Can Brute Deterrence Backfire? 
Perceptions and Attitudes in Taxpayer Compliance, in Why People Pay Taxes 193 (Joel Slemrod 
ed., 1992) (suggesting the importance of effective enforcement that is visible to the taxpay-
ing community). 
213. Ayres & Braithwaite, supra note 26, at 19 (internal citation omitted). 
214. Becker, supra note 38, at 402. 
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research. Research efforts have been undertaken in the hope of 
gaining a better handle on how to foster tax compliance and 
minimize the tax gap. In this ever-expanding area of study, impor-
tant advances have been made in modeling the taxpaying 
decisionmaking process and, more recently, exploring the relation-
ship between taxpayers and the tax authority and how this 
relationship shapes compliance. These developments were accom-
plished against the backdrop of a growing body of survey 
information, as well as empirical and experimental work. More 
than anything, however, the extensive research has demonstrated 
that tax noncompliance is a serious and complex problem, subject 
to a wide range of causes and influencers. 
To a great degree, the economic paradigm dictates efforts to en-
force tax compliance. The economic model emphasizes the 
consequences of behavior and the extent to which these conse-
quences serve people’s self-interest as the most important 
determinants for compliance. According to this model, taxpayers 
who fail to comply with their tax obligations are not manifesting 
antisocial or deviant characteristics. These taxpayers are simply ra-
tional actors who attempt to maximize their expected utility given 
the costs and benefits associated with the courses of action avail-
able to them. Enforcement techniques drawing on the economic 
model, therefore, look to decrease the expected utility of noncom-
pliance by increasing the probability or the severity of punishment 
for offenders, thereby deterring potential lawbreakers and promot-
ing tax compliance as the rational (meaning, beneficial) choice of 
behavior.  
While the research in compliance is far from conclusive, it does 
appear to support the economic model to the extent that taxpayers 
are generally sensitive to the expected payoffs of compliant and 
noncompliant behavior. Other things being equal, taxpayers who 
face higher probabilities of detection or punishment tend to com-
ply more than those who face lower risks. Increasingly, however, 
there is a growing understanding among tax researchers and ad-
ministrators that there is more to compliance than the probability 
and severity of punishment. A host of considerations influence 
taxpayers, including the desires to comply with social norms, to be 
honest citizens, to avoid the psychological stress attached to dull-
ards with the tax authority, and to correct perceived injustices in 
the tax system.  
Understanding the reasons for and influences on taxpayer be-
haviors has a direct impact on the design of enforcement policies 
and their capacity to improve compliance. If taxpayers care about 
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matters beyond narrowly defined self-interest, applying enforce-
ment strategies that rely exclusively on monetary considerations—
particularly through authoritarian deterrence of detection and 
punishment—might not only be ineffective. Such an approach 
could also backfire by undermining the goodwill and intrinsic mo-
tivations of taxpayers to comply, generating distrust and 
antagonism, and ultimately exacerbating (rather than easing) the 
problem of noncompliance. Instead of abandoning enforcement 
policies based on detection and punishment, these enforcement 
mechanisms should be balanced against other measures that will 
complement punitive deterrence and offset its negative repercus-
sions. This Article has advanced the proposition that this balance 
can be achieved by broadening the definition of deterrence to in-
clude measures that nurture the social responsibility and ethics of 
taxpayers and that aim to encourage tax compliance as well as dis-
courage noncompliance.  
The Australian compliance model offers a framework that in-
corporates a balanced and forward-looking approach to the 
enforcement of taxes such as just described. Drawing on the prin-
ciples of responsive regulation and the motivational posturing 
doctrine, the Australian model conceptualizes behavior not only as 
a result of the needs, desires, and constraints of an autonomous 
taxpayer but it also considers that the taxpayer is heavily influ-
enced by environmental conditions, including norms, values, and 
habits, and by the nature of the taxpayer/tax-authority interaction. 
By emphasizing the role that this interaction plays in shaping tax-
payer behavior, the tax administration is empowered to own up to 
its administrative responsibilities and explore the different ways in 
which it can manage this relationship. The idea here is not only to 
enforce compliance where it is deficient. The idea is to also 
strengthen and manage compliance fairly and efficiently, such that 
voluntary reporting improves both in scope and duration. The 
emphasis on voluntary reporting is especially important in taxation 
given that the tax law is constantly changing and is often complex 
and vulnerable to manipulation. Instead of putting endless efforts 
into meeting unrealistic expectations of compliance, enforcement 
policies might be more effective if they emphasize self-regulation 
through assistance and persuasion, and only when necessary shift 
to punitive enforcement and intrusive regulation. 
The Australian compliance model makes a case for the superior-
ity of an enforcement strategy that is gradual and proportional in 
its capacity and willingness to apply sanctions. It represents a move 
away from static deterrence advocated by early economic theorists 
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and embraces a dynamic framework that reflects the interplay of 
the taxpayer/tax-authority interaction. Accordingly, the regulatory 
goal is no longer to identify a particular recipe for optimal deter-
rence, but instead to find an optimal way to play “the enforcement 
game.”215 An administration that endorses the Australian approach, 
employing its tit-for-tat methodology, plays the enforcement game 
responsively. It works to protect the taxpayer community against 
lawbreakers while leaving room for the fostering tax morale.  
With growing interest around the world in tax administration that 
focuses on customer service, and embracing a dynamic approach to 
the study and enforcement of compliance, the Australian compli-
ance model has the potential to generate different—possibly more 
effective—conclusions regarding tax enforcement than what we 
have seen thus far from the traditional economic analysis of compli-
ance. In fact, the Australian model can be viewed as yet another 
advancement of the economic paradigm to the extent that it draws 
on the principles of rational behavior. The Australian approach 
takes a step further, however, and supplements the economic in-
terpretation to tax enforcement with other theories, particularly 
those that involve taxpayer identity, conflict escalation, and proce-
dural justice. The extent to which this approach yields different 
enforcement dynamics or better compliance results than the tradi-
tional economic paradigm, however, has yet to be fully determined. 
The essence of the Australian approach lies in its underlying prin-
ciples and dynamic methodology rather than in any specific 
enforcement and regulatory tools or mechanisms. And, while its 
open-ended regulatory design may be a key advantage, it might 
also become its main weakness.  
The Australian model, by relying on a method that emphasizes 
the process of enforcement (“managing relationships”) rather than 
any one defined regulatory or enforcement mechanism, presents 
challenges in its practical application. Considerable resources are 
needed to develop the range of regulatory and enforcement 
measures required for different industries, to test the effectiveness 
of each measure, and to fit the various measures into the model as 
a whole. It is unclear, for example, which regulatory and 
enforcement tools best encourage voluntary compliance at the 
bottom of the pyramid, how the tax administration can effectively 
(and efficiently) present the repercussions of noncompliance to 
taxpayers such that they are encouraged to comply early in the 
regulatory process, which deterrent measures can be carried out 
(and to what extent) without unnecessarily alienating taxpayers, 
                                                   
215. Ayres & Braithwaite, supra note 26, at 51. 
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and how incapacitation can be achieved in taxation through 
measures other than prosecution and incarceration.  
In addition, to generalize the Australian model to tax admini-
strations in other countries, more work is needed to identify 
relevant compliance problems, to understand the characteristics of 
local taxpayer communities, and to explore the political and socie-
tal support for different enforcement and regulatory strategies. All 
these issues and others may be addressed partly through the trial 
and error of enforcement efforts and partly through empirical and 
experimental work. The responsiveness of the Australian model may 
become especially problematic, however, if tax agents and adminis-
trators interpret and apply the model in ways that are inappropriate 
or otherwise unintended by the supporting enforcement policy. This 
risk is inherent in administrative practices generally, but the combi-
nation of an escalating range of enforcement and regulation, the 
complex and fluid nature of motivational postures, and the extent 
of discretion in a dynamic administrative style of interaction might 
lead to overly lenient or harsh enforcement compared to a more 
conventional approach.  
At the end of the day, the main advantage of the Australian 
model may be its ability to offer tax administrators and researchers 
a broad, even if incomplete, roadmap for tax enforcement that in-
corporates a set of checks and balances on punitive deterrence. 
Furthermore, the Australian model touches on critical issues in 
compliance and regulation that are well deserving of policy atten-
tion and debate. The fact that this model does not come with a self-
explanatory guide may not necessarily be a disadvantage, as it 
forces tax administrators and policymakers to debate and reach 
decisions in a deliberate and intentional manner. In a few years, as 
the Australian tax administration continues releasing compliance 
improvement data and different prototypes of the original compli-
ance model are developed in Australia and elsewhere, we may be 
in a better position to evaluate the advantages and disadvantages of 
the responsive approach to taxation and, particularly, the role it 
plays in increasing the integrity of the tax system. In the meantime, 
more efforts should be devoted to the undertaking of comparative 
work that investigates the relevance of responsive regulation to 
U.S. tax administration,216 to test the hypotheses of the Australian 
model, and to generate important insights and advances in both 
the theoretical analysis and the empirical research of compliance. 
                                                   
216. E.g., John Braithwaite, Markets in Vice, Markets in Virtue (2005) (examin-
ing the application of responsive regulation to area of corporate taxation in Australia and 
the United States). 
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Until we have more information, we should be careful not to dis-
miss what could be the promising beginning of a new era of tax 
enforcement.  
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